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REMOVING THE MASS MISPERCEPTION: A
CONSIDERATION OF MASS
ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS AND REMOVAL
JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Oil is one of the most constructive resources fueling our everyday
life—it can also be one of the most destructive. 1 On April 20, 2010, at
approximately 10:00 P.M. CST, the United States experienced one of the
greatest environmental catastrophes in its history.2 Methane gas from a
well located on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico
expanded into a drilling rig, caught fire, and exploded, killing nearly a
dozen British Petroleum (“BP”) employees and injuring many others. 3
Over the next 87 days, 4.9 billion barrels of oil leaked into the Gulf of
Mexico, impacting approximately 68,000 square miles of the ocean along
the Gulf Islands, Intercostal Waterway, Pensacola Beach, and several
states including Texas, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 4
1
See Alan Neuhauser, Oil Spills Aplenty Since Exxon Valdez, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/03/25/us-racks-up-dozens-of-oil
-spills-in-25-years-since-exxon-valdez [https://perma.cc/QR4Q-95NJ] (providing a graphic
chart of oil spills that have occurred within the United States since the Exxon Valdez disaster
of March 1989); see also Oil Can Do More, WINTERSHALL, http://www.wintershall.com/en/
company/oil-and-gas/oil-can-do-more.html [https://perma.cc/7SGE-3XA6] (explaining
some of the useful purposes of crude oil). Crude oil generates heat, fuels our mechanisms of
travel, and drives our factory machines. Oil Can Do More, supra note 1. Day-to-day materials
such as paints, plastics, detergents, and even some medicine contain components of crude
oil. Id.
2
See The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: The World’s Largest Accidental Offshore Oil, U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME
(Aug.
2010),
http://na.unep.net/geas/getUNEPPageWithArticleID
Script.php?article_id=65 [https://perma.cc/RSC6-QZRC] (detailing the facts of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Debbie Elliott & Scott Horsley, How an Oil Spill Spread
into a National Crisis, NPR (May 5, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/05/05/126508979/
how-an-oil-spill-spread-into-a-national-crisis [https://perma.cc/WBZ5-YARD] (discussing
the tragic consequences associated with the oil spill).
3
See Elliot & Horsley, supra note 2 (providing details of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill);
see also Sharon Dunn, Fracking 101: Breaking Down the Most Important Part of Today’s Oil, Gas
Drilling, GREELEY TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/9558384113/drilling-oil-equipment-wellbore# [https://perma.cc/Z32C-G5RM] (defining a drilling
rig as a machine used to drill a hole, which is what forms the well for the extraction of natural
resources such as oil).
4
See Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels into
Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695.html
[https://perma.cc/2W53-EXQR] (describing the amount of oil that was spilled during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Daniel Gilbert & Sarah Kent, BP Agrees to Pay $18.7
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On July 3, 2015, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana announced BP must pay an additional $18.7 billion in
settlement fees to the state and federal government, increasing BP’s total
liability to $53.8 billion for criminal and civil penalties and cleanup costs.5
However, the sum of $53.8 billion did not include any damages to the
privately owned businesses that suffered because of the oil spill. 6 Under
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), these business owners may
consolidate their claims against BP into one action known as a mass action
lawsuit.7 If the business owners file their lawsuit against BP in state court,
then BP has the opportunity to remove the action to federal court. 8 These
small business owners, who may prefer to litigate their case in a state
court, can then move to remand the case back to state court. 9 However, a
problem arises when the federal court must determine whether it is proper

Billion to Settle Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2015) (suggesting the
states that were impacted by the oil spill).
5
See Gilbert & Kent, supra note 4 (stating the breakdown of the BP settlement as follows:
$5.5 billion for violation of the Clean Water Act, $1 billion for 400 local government claims,
$7.3 billion for the natural resources damages, and $4.9 billion for the 5 state claims).
6
See id. (providing additional information as to the financial breakdown of British
Petroleum’s (“BP”) settlement as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill); see also Tourism
Industry Impacts: The Deepwater Horizon Spill, CONVERSATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVTL. DEV.
(July 1, 2010), http://credbc.ca/tourism-industry-impacts-the-deepwater-horizon-spill/
[https://perma.cc/9RXJ-Q9HP] [hereinafter CRED] (discussing the impact of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill on local businesses). Due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
and the potential safety risks of areas that were harmed, the tourism industry in states such
as Louisiana suffered. CRED, supra note 6. According to the Louisiana Office of Tourism,
twenty-six percent of individuals who intended to visit Louisiana had cancelled or
postponed their trips. Id. The hospitality industry across the states of Louisiana, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Florida experienced an increase in cancellations of reservations by sixty
percent, as well as forty-two percent more difficulty in booking future events. Id. Over 7.3
million businesses throughout Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas were
harmed as a result of the oil spill that affected 34.4 million employees and cost $5.2 trillion
in sales volume. Id. The Institute for Business and Home Safety estimated twenty-five
percent of the businesses that were harmed from a major disaster did not reopen. Id.
7
See Annika K. Martin, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of
Mexico, LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN ATT’YS AT L. (2016), http://www.lieff
cabraser.com/Case-Center/BP-Gulf-Oil-Spill.shtml
[https://perma.cc/W5AD-DU9D]
(contributing a list of the lawsuits brought by private property owners against BP).
8
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (explaining when a mass action constitutes a
class action under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)); see also § 1332(d)(4) (providing
the requirements for when a district court must refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a class
action).
9
See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (allowing mass actions to be remanded to state court if the
claims of the parties arise from the same event or occurrence). The exception preventing the
removal of a mass action where all the claims arise out of the same event or occurrence under
the CAFA is known as the single local event exception. Id.
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to grant the motion to remand the case back to state court.10 A mass action
may be remanded back to the state court under the single local event
exception if the parties’ claims arise out of the same event or occurrence.11
Currently, the CAFA does not provide a clear definition of what
constitutes the same event or occurrence for the purposes of the single
local event exception; thus, many courts waste valuable time litigating this
issue, which produces inconsistent results. 12 As a result, the CAFA
standard fails to promote the common principles of allocating past losses,
minimizing or potentially preventing future accidents, and discouraging
classes of people from engaging in conduct that poses an excessive risk of
personal injury or property damage.13
To provide a clear interpretation of the single local event exception,
this Note proposes a four-factor test for the federal courts to implement,
which will remove the vague standard of what is considered the same
event or occurrence for the purpose of remanding a mass action back to
state court.14 First, Part II discusses the characteristics of toxic torts and
environmental torts by looking at the recent court cases that caused a
three-way circuit split when trying to define the same event or
occurrence.15 Then, Part III analyzes the problem with the current circuit
split and argues courts need to adopt a clear standard for the single local
event exception.16 Next, Part IV, for public policy reasons, proposes the
SORT Test and suggests that the federal courts implement this test. 17
10
See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (discussing when a mass action is able to be remanded back to
state court).
11
See § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (exploring the jurisdiction of class actions and mass actions of
the CAFA); see also § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (defining mass action and explaining a mass action is
removable as a class action under the CAFA); Martin, supra note 7 (providing a list of cases
where private property owners brought a suit against BP); infra Part II (discussing generally
the problem with removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA).
12
See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of not having a clear definition of the same event
or occurrence under the single local event exception, taking into consideration the
characteristics of environmental toxic tort claims).
13
See infra Part III (arguing it is good public policy to deter accidents and prevent harm);
see also Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY 671, 671
(1976) (stating that the Latin phrase ignorantia juris non exusat translates to ignorance of the
law excuses no one). To uphold this legal principle, courts should provide clear guidelines
for the parties to understand. Cass, supra note 13, at 671.
14
See infra Part IV (proposing the SORT Test, a balancing test for courts to adopt). This
Note focuses on the three-way circuit split for determining what constitutes “the same event
or occurrence” under the CAFA for the removal of mass environmental torts. See infra Part
II (discussing toxic tort litigation).
15
See infra Part II (considering the characteristics of toxic environmental torts and general
tort public policy).
16
See infra Part III (evaluating the three-way circuit split and arguing that for public policy
reasons the circuit split needs to be resolved).
17
See infra Part IV (proposing a four-factor test and evaluating it).
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Finally, Part V concludes by reiterating the importance of establishing a
clear standard for the single local event exception under the CAFA. 18
II. BACKGROUND
Chief Judge Howard Thomas Markey of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated “[t]he differences between the
judicial and the scientific-technological processes are profound and
pervasive. Failure to recognize that difference has led to judicial
expressions of frustration and an unfortunate tendency to rest judicial
decisions on current, and often transient, ‘truths’ and ‘facts’ of science and
technology.”19 The fact specific nature of environmental toxic torts along
with complicated scientific concepts produce vague standards; therefore,
the standards are impossible to apply accurately and consistently. 20 As
such, the issue of whether a mass environmental tort action falls under an
exception of the CAFA, specifically the same event or occurrence
exception, is challenging to litigate and one the American court system
struggles to evaluate.21
Ultimately, the courts have failed to determine one concise and
cohesive standard to apply to the single local event exception. 22 Allen v.
The Boeing Company created a three-way circuit split between the Third,
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and demonstrated the inconsistency of
determining the issue of what constitutes the same event or occurrence for

18
See infra Part V (summarizing the need for courts to have a single standard for the single
local event exception under the CAFA).
19
Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 741 (N.J. 1991).
20
See infra Part II.A.1 (evaluating the characteristics of environmental torts); infra Part
III.A (addressing how the characteristics of environmental torts apply to scientific
knowledge).
21
See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (stating
that there is no anti-removal presumption for a removal action in the CAFA); Benko v.
Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the District
Court abused its discretion and the plaintiffs met the burden of proving their class action
claim fell within the single local event exception); Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736
F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing one of the other requirements of the single local event
exception regarding the diversity of citizenship of the plaintiffs); Coleman v. Estes Express
Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that a diversity class action
should be remanded from the federal court back to the state court when two of the criteria
for the single local event exception were not met). Each of these cases provide some insight
into every aspect of the single local event exception under the CAFA; however, for purposes
of this Note, the approach is very narrow and looks at only one aspect of the single local
event exception, which is the same event or occurrence requirement.
22
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problems with the vague approach to resolving the
issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts under the CAFA).
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the purposes of removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA.23
First, Part II.A examines toxic environmental torts and the hurdles parties
encounter when litigating toxic tort cases.24 Next, Part II.B evaluates mass
actions and removal jurisdiction under the same event or occurrence
language of the CAFA.25 Finally, Part II.C provides the relevant
information pertaining to the circuit split in the Third, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits.26
A. A General Overview of Mass Environmental Torts and Tort Public Policy
The resulting harm caused by environmental torts differs from case to
case; therefore, lawsuits involving toxic torts tend to be more fact
specific.27 The fact specific nature associated with mass toxic and
environmental torts makes it challenging for courts to interpret the same
event or occurrence exception under the CAFA using traditional methods
of judicial interpretation.28 Part II.A.1 provides the relevant characteristics
23
See infra Part II.C (discussing the facts and rulings of the recent cases from the Third,
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits); see also Tom Cummins & Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J. OF L.: A
PERIODICAL LAB. OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 59, 60–61, 63–65 (2012) (exploring the characteristics
of circuit splits and ultimately measuring circuit court performance based on the resolutions
of circuit splits). A circuit split exists when a federal court of appeals decides a case that
conflicts with the decision of another federal court of appeals. Cummins & Aft, supra note
23, at 60.
24
See infra Part II.A (evaluating the characteristics of toxic torts and how their
characteristics can challenge the promotion of general tort public policy).
25
See infra Part II.B (considering the characteristics of mass torts under the CAFA and the
vague language used within the CAFA causing problems for the courts when interpreting
the legislation).
26
See infra Part II.C (providing the relevant facts and holdings to each of the cases in the
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits).
27
See infra Part II.A (reviewing the characteristics of toxic torts); see also Dan Tarlock, Is
There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 222 (2004) (stating
that environmental law is defined as “a synthesis of pre-environmental era common law
rules, principles from other areas of law, and post-environmental era statutes . . . and other
areas of science, economics[,] and ethics”). To exemplify the factual context of environmental
torts, consider this metaphor to the medical field written solely by the author. Much like a
doctor considers a list of symptoms to determine a diagnosis, a judge must listen to the
specific facts of a case to decide a ruling. In the medical field, the symptoms in one patient
may not heed the same ailment in another patient, and this is the case in environmental torts.
Each environmental tort is different, brought about by a unique set of facts and
circumstances, each with a different chemical makeup of hazardous material that may
impact the environment, the people, and businesses around them differently.
28
See Joey Senat, Methods of Judicial Interpretation, OKLA. ST. U. (June 21, 2013),
https://media.okstate.edu/faculty/jsenat/jb3163/methods.html
[https://perma.cc/
H4ZS-9ZJN] (explaining the different types of judicial interpretation). The different methods
of judicial interpretation are:
literalism, original intent, doctrinal approach, and
structuralism. Id. Each method of interpretation has its advantages and disadvantages. Id.
Under the literalism method, the judge will look to the literal text of the document, using no
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of toxic environmental torts.29 Part II.A.2 discusses general tort public
policy as applicable to toxic tort characteristics.30
1.

The Nexus of Toxic Torts and Environmental Torts

An individual files a toxic tort lawsuit when a hazardous material
causes harm to the individual or his or her property.31 Whereas, an
external sources as support. Id. While literalism removes the possibility of misinterpretation
of the law, the literalism approach is challenging when there is any ambiguity or imprecise
language. Id. Lack of specificity exists under the current interpretation of the CAFA. Id.
Under the original intent method, the court looks to the historic basis of the document to
determine what the purpose of the law is and what the drafters intended the law to mean.
Senat, supra note 28. The original intent approach provides a basis to begin when
unanticipated circumstances arise, which is applicable to the problem with the CAFA. Id.
The doctrinal approach is also known by the Latin phrase of stare decisis, which translates to
“let the decision stand.” Id. This means new cases should be decided the same way as old
cases, so long as the facts are similar. Id. This approach has not been successfully applied to
the issue of removal jurisdiction because currently there are three different holdings on what
is considered the same event or occurrence under the CAFA. Id. The final method of judicial
interpretation is structuralism, which considers the larger relationship within the document,
not its specific provisions. Id. For example, for removal jurisdiction, the judges would look
to the whole document of the CAFA, not just the section discussing mass actions as class
actions for the purposes of removal using structuralism. Senat, supra note 28. This approach
tends to be more problematic and likely will not apply in the interpretation of the CAFA for
this Note because it provides a more subjective and abstract approach. Id. See also infra Part
II (evaluating the characteristics of environmental torts); infra Part III.A (addressing how the
characteristics of environmental torts apply to scientific knowledge).
29
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the characteristics of toxic torts and explaining how the
unique characteristics of toxic torts relate to the problem of removal jurisdiction of mass
actions under the CAFA).
30
See infra Part II.A.2 (providing the public policy surrounding issues involving torts and
toxic torts and explaining how the circuit split does not promote sound tort public policy).
31
See L. Neal Ellis, Jr., Introduction, in TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 2 (D. Alan Rudlin ed., 2007)
(explaining what toxic torts are and are not); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2012) (describing a
hazardous substance). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) is codified in the United States Code under 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
§ 9601. CERCLA defines a hazardous substance as:
[A]ny substance designated pursuant to section 311(b)(2)(A) of the
Federal Water Pollution Act [33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A)], (B) any element,
compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the
characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] (but not including any
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any
toxic pollutant listed under section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)], (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any
imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to
which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the
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environmental tort claim is filed when the harm results from a hazardous
substance that impacts the environment and characteristically violates a
federal statute.32 Environmental torts can become toxic torts when a toxic
substance detrimentally affects both the environment and an individual
or their land.33 Traditionally, environmental tort cases contain more
hurdles for the plaintiff to overcome than a normal tort case, such as
negligence or battery.34 Courts review environmental torts under a
Toxic Substances Control Act [15 U.S.C. § 2606]. The term does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas,
or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
Id. Although crude oil is not defined as a hazardous substance under CERCLA, it is
considered hazardous by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
Hazard Communication Standard. Material Safety Data Sheet Crude Oil, TESORO (Feb. 1,
2011),
https://tsocorpsite.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/crude-oil-generic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WJE2-D73T]; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental
Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 602–03 (1993) (discussing liability for
environmental torts under CERCLA). CERCLA is an environmental statute designed to
accomplish the cleanup of hazardous materials through “the expenditure of cleanup costs
from a fund (hence the name ‘Superfund’) raised through a series of different taxes” and
through the “imposition of liability for the cost of cleanup on the ‘responsible parties.’”
Abraham, supra note 31, at 602–03.
32
See Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2256, 2256 (2015) (evaluating and contrasting environmental law and toxic torts).
33
See Ben A. Franklin, Toxic Cloud Leaks at Carbide Plant in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/12/us/toxic-cloud-leaks-at-carbide-plant-inwest-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/Q99X-Y6YW] (exemplifying a situation where
environmental and toxic torts collided). On August 11, 1985, a Union Carbide Corporation
plant in West Virginia released aldicarb oxime, a chemical, which when combined with
methyl isocyanate, creates a compound used in pesticides. Id. Because of this incident, 135
residents of Charleston, West Virginia were treated for eye, throat, and lung irritation, and
twenty-eight individuals were admitted to a hospital near the Union Carbide plant. Id. The
leak lasted about fifteen minutes and resulted from a failed gasket on a 500-gallon storage
tank that contained the aldicarb oxime. Id. Broadcasts encouraged residents to stay inside
and turn off their air conditioning and other forms of ventilation to prevent the chemical
from traveling indoors. Id. This incident exemplifies how a chemical that harms the
environment, in this case, the air, can also harm individuals within the surrounding
communities, interlinking both environmental law and toxic torts. Id.
34
See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1445–46 (2005) (arguing that for a tort system to return a fair recovery of
damages, judges must adjudicate cases individually based on their specific facts). Two
common hurdles in toxic tort litigation are accounting for the latency period for the harm to
appear within the plaintiff and proving that the defendant actually caused the harm. Id. at
1445. There tends to be more hurdles for a plaintiff in an environmental tort case because
unlike a tort case, such as battery, where cause and effect is readily identifiable, the cause
and effect in environmental tort cases can be less apparent. Id. at 1441–42. As such, the
plaintiff in an environmental tort case has more “formidable problems of proof.” Id. at 1445.
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negligence standard rather than a strict liability standard, and thus the
plaintiff must prove issues of causation and a high latency of harm. 35
Toxic torts differ from other types of civil litigation in many key ways,
which cause challenges during litigation. 36 These characteristics need to
be acknowledged because they play a significant role in the concept of
removal jurisdiction for mass environmental actions under the CAFA. 37
First, plaintiffs have difficulty identifying the defendant(s)
responsible for their harm because environmental toxic torts typically
involve numerous plaintiffs and defendants, unlike other areas of tort

35
See id. (discussing the standard of review for environmental torts); see also Bill Charles
Wells, The Grin without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic Exposure without Present Injury,
18 WM. & MARY J. OF ENVTL. L. 285, 288–90 (1994) (addressing the characteristics of the harm
that can be caused by toxic torts). In a latency period, the full effect of the exposure to the
hazardous material is not immediately apparent. Id. at 288–90. Thus, the resulting harm
suffered by the plaintiff may be delayed, and this ultimately creates a problem with the
elements of causation and resulting harm, unlike a normal tort action. Id. at 289. See also
Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 479,
481 (2003) (considering the element of causation necessary to recover damages in a toxic tort
lawsuit). Some latency effects are: cancers, birth defects, and other life altering diseases. Id.
at 481. See also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2191 (2014) (discussing the delay
in detecting a harm caused by latency periods). The delay can range from as little as ten
years to as many as thirty years or more. Id. A clear standard would help ensure that those
plaintiffs who have a latency period associated with their injury may have a successful
lawsuit against the defendant who caused their harm. Id.
36
See Wells, supra note 35, at 288–90 (providing the four characteristics of environmental
torts). Toxic torts differ from other types of torts in four ways: toxic torts involve a large
number of plaintiffs and defendants, toxic torts have challenges in identifying the source of
harm, the litigation procedure surrounding toxic torts is complex, and scientific evidence is
used to resolve causation issues. Id.
37
See id. (suggesting the four characteristics of environmental torts that can make mass
tort litigation challenging); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing the requirements for
the removal of civil actions). In general, environmental torts are civil actions because they
do not have a criminal aspect to the claim. § 1441. Removal jurisdiction is a situation where
a defendant to a civil action filed in a state court may motion to have the matter litigated in
federal court. Id. See Jeffrey S. Gutman, Removal Jurisdiction, FED. PRAC. MANUAL FOR LEGAL
AID ATT’Y (2015), http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/14 [https://perma.cc/49WYTWSX] (examining the general overview of removal jurisdiction to federal courts). When an
issue of removal arises, courts consider whether the federal court could have initially
exercised jurisdiction over the case. Id. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over class
actions. Id. The problem arises when courts deem a mass action a class action. Id. Under
the CAFA, a mass action is not a class action when the claims of the plaintiffs arise out of the
same event or occurrence. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). Thus, the mass action is not removable to
federal court as a class action. Id. Another problem arises when determining the definition
of the same event or occurrence for removal jurisdiction of mass actions. See infra Part II
(explaining the relevant background information surrounding the same event or
occurrence); infra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA, why it was ratified, and the problems with
the current context of the act).
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law.38 As such, federal and state courts have implemented different
causation tests to determine the proportion of liability each defendant
shares.39 In addition, due to the multiparty claims and the difficulty
proving causation, the litigation of environmental toxic torts
characteristically results in complex procedures. 40 Thus, courts will not
consolidate cases if doing so will result in a delay or any unnecessary
burdens on the parties.41
38
See Ellis, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining the challenge of identifying defendants in toxic
tort cases). Multiparty lawsuits, if they involve an exceedingly large number of plaintiffs or
defendants, can be a mass action and classified as a class action. Id. This allows federal
courts to have jurisdiction over the mass action because class actions fall under federal court
jurisdiction. Id. See also Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885, 887–89 (1996) (addressing the need to
find a proper way to litigate a claim with a fictitious defendant). The unique nature of
environmental toxic torts may also raise the issue of a fictitious defendant. Id. A fictitious
defendant is a situation where a party suing is not sure whether there are unknown persons
involved in a suit. Id. at 885. Typically, these unknown defendants get fake names, such as
John Doe and Jane Doe. Id. Traditionally, for many types of torts, the statute of limitations
is relatively short which pressures the plaintiff seeking to recover to file his or her complaint.
Id. at 887–88. This theory of a fictitious defendant is a tactic used to preserve the limitation
period for the plaintiff, and with leave of court, the name can later be amended to include
the defendants who have been identified. Id. at 888–89.
39
See Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010),
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law
[https://perma.cc/9V36-NEKT]
(discussing the concept of causation in a tort claim). Causation may be broken down into
two classes of theories: the cause-in-fact theory and the criteria for determining
responsibility for causing the harm. Id. Compare Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1106
(N.Y. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that when two or more tortfeasors act together to produce one
single injury suffered by the plaintiff, those defendants may be held jointly and severally
liable), with Suria v. Shiffman, 490 N.E.2d 832, 837 (1986) (“[W]hen two tortfeasors neither
act in concert nor contribute concurrently to the same wrong, they are not joint tortfeasors;
rather, their wrongs are independent and successive.”).
40
See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (stating if actions before the court involve a common question
of law or fact, the court may: consolidate actions, join for a hearing any or all matters at issue
in the action, or enter any other orders to avoid unnecessary costs or delays); see also Debra
Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 335 (2006) (considering the common
problem of forum shopping that is prevalent in complex litigation); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 553–57 (1989) (explaining
forum shopping in both domestic and international lawsuits and evaluating the reasons why
parties may opt to forum shop); see also Complex Litigation Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS. (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Civil/Complex-Litigation/Resource-Guide.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZXA9-C7VL] (providing that mass torts and class actions are two types
of complex litigation).
41
See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (giving the rule for consolidation of a claim). Consolidation is
a way to join claims of parties that involve a common question of law or fact for a joint
hearing or trial. Id. If combining the claims would create prejudice or if it more effective to
hold separate trials, the court may also order separate trials for any issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). See also Shump v.
Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978) (supporting the district court’s decision to
consolidate as is within its discretion).
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Another characteristic of toxic tort litigation is that toxic torts tend to
be driven by science and require that the parties, jury, and judge be able
to rely on, interpret, and understand grandiose scientific concepts used as
evidence to prove the resulting harm.42 As a result, courts must determine
the effects that exposure to chemicals unknown to the average citizen,
such as asbestos, benzene, and dioxins, have on the plaintiff. 43 For
example, when adjudicating a toxic tort claim, courts evaluate the
plaintiff’s exposure to the toxin and whether the injury was a result of the
exposure to the toxin. 44 A plaintiff must establish that the substance is
capable of causing the injury at issue and the exposure to the substance is,
in fact, what caused the injury.45 Finally, to prove these two issues, courts
must not only understand whether a particular substance can cause the
resulting harm, but also determine the harm suffered by the plaintiff.46
Litigants prove the factual standings through scientific mechanisms such
42
See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (viewing toxic
tort litigation as a subset of products liability holding that “cases . . . are won or lost on the
strength of the scientific evidence presented to prove causation”); see also infra Part III.A
(analyzing the problem of the need to apply scientific reasoning to toxic tort litigation).
43
See Note, supra note 32, at 2256–57 (2015) (discussing the causal link of an actor’s
negligent behavior and the resulting harm inflicted on another). In all tort claims there are
common features of liability and causation. Id. Causation provides many problems in
environmental tort litigation; however, there are some factors of tort claims that are relevant
only to certain areas of tort law. Id. Environmental torts and toxic torts treat causation
differently, creating the challenge of determining whether the harmful substance directly
caused the resulting harm suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at 2257. Also, the Federal Rules of
Evidence state:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods of the facts of the
case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2014). See also Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns
of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (1988) (exploring the concerns associated with
mass litigation and the new characteristics associated with mass torts).
44
See J. Michael Veron, The Trial of Toxic Torts: Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert,
57 LA. L. REV. 647, 647–48 (1997) (evaluating how the litigation procedure of toxic torts has
changed since Daubert); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579–80
(1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence successfully limit and interpret how
scientific evidence is to be used to prove causation).
45
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579–80 (providing the standard for judges to consider scientific
evidence); see also Lin, supra note 34, at 1446–47 (explaining the elements necessary to
establish a toxic tort claim as the plaintiff and what evidence is needed to bring a toxic tort
claim).
46
See Lin, supra note 34, at 1447 (considering the duties of the court when evaluating and
adjudicating a toxic tort claim).
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as epidemiology.47 The use of scientific evidence contributes to the overall
problem because it requires judges to handle highly technical, factual
issues that may have no set scientific conclusion, which influences the
ruling and the consistency of the rulings. 48 In contrast, other areas of tort
47
See Melissa Moore Thompson, Causal Interference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic
Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1992) (exploring the causal connection of
epidemiology and how it relates to toxic tort litigation); see also Stephanie A. Scharf,
Introduction, in The Use of Epidemiology in Tort Litigation 2–3 n.5 (2007),
http://www.schoeman.com/assets/pdf/scharf/The_Use_of_Epidemiology_in_Tort_Litig
ation_Introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH5B-ARXM] (introducing epidemiology and its
use in tort litigation). Epidemiology is “the science concerned with the study of the factors
determining and influencing the frequency and distribution of disease, injury, and other
health-related events and their causes in a defined human population . . . .” Scharf, supra
note 47, at 2. Epidemiology melds the worlds of the hard sciences and statistics to determine
the relationship between exposure to a substance and the resulting injury. Id. Scharf
provides an example illustrating this relationship:
An investigator may measure and correlate a range of background
characteristics (e.g., gender, left-handedness, family history of breast
cancer, low income); exposures (e.g., smoking, workplace chemicals, xray, pharmaceuticals, Agent Orange); and positive or negative health
consequences (e.g., lung cancer, depression, infertility, Hepatitis C,
efficacy of the vaccine, lower risk of hypertension, AIDS, obesity).
Sometimes a characteristic does not neatly fall into one or the other
category, e.g., obesity may be a family characteristic as well as a health
consequence.
Id. at 3. See also Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An Historical Background, 1979–
87, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 86, 88–90, 94 (1992) (providing a detailed explanation of toxic
torts and the litigation procedure within American law). Epidemiology allows evidence to
be used to assist the judge with understanding how the resulting harm impacts the health
and welfare of the parties involved and considering how hazardous substances affect the
human body. Id. at 89–119. See also Note, supra note 32, at 2268–69 (providing the scientific
implications of toxic torts). The causation issue involved in toxic torts can result in
discrepancies. Id. at 2268–71. One problem involved with litigating these issues is, as science
continually advances, there is more research that may change a ruling in the future. Id. at
2271. See also infra Part IV.A (suggesting a four factor test for courts to adopt).
48
See Note, supra note 32, at 2270 (discussing judges’ abilities to litigate technical issues);
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803) (explaining the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is); United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009)
(stating that when looking to determine the scope of a statute, one must look to the ordinary
meaning in the language of the statute); Lark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and
Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 740–
45 (Nov. 2011) (analyzing the gap between tort common law and recent legislative
developments to provide remedies to individuals who suffer environmental harm); Frank C.
Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV 509, 512–13 (Dec. 1947)
(evaluating how judges and courts interpret regulations). Because of ambiguities in
legislation that have raised legal issues for courts to resolve and because of the public policy
of respecting the other branches of government, this circuit split should be resolved. Id.
Judges have become a beacon for interpreting and resolving those issues. Id. Because judges’
opinions are highly regarded, it is imperative that they properly interpret the law to promote
justice in the judicial system. Id. Newman, when discussing the value of judges’ opinions
stated:
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law rarely have technical disputes regarding causation between the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.49
Each of the aforementioned problems have the underlying component
of causation.50 Causation is problematic for the plaintiff in environmental
toxic tort lawsuits because the plaintiff usually cannot draw a direct causal
connection between the defendant’s activity and the injury alleged. 51
Judges’ opinions are emphasized, not because they are more correct or
socially significant than, say, the opinions of government officials or
Wall Street lawyers, but because they are authoritative. Since they are
authoritative, government officials, Wall Street lawyers[,] and anyone
else who would acquire expertness in this field must know their
framework and their logic.
Id. See also infra Part II.C (discussing the problem with the circuit splits).
49
See Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law,
1988–91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 25 (1993) (exploring
the evaluation of American toxic tort law in relation to the nature and limitations of toxic tort
liability). The area of torts and causation is highly contested and continually debated. Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 18 (2010)
(evaluating the liability of a defendant in a tort lawsuit). A defendant who knows or has
reason to know of a risk that may occur from his or her conduct, and fails to warn of the
danger may be liable. Id. If the defendant does adequately warn the plaintiff of the risk, it
is possible that the defendant may still be held liable if the defendant fails to adopt further
precautions to protect against the risk if the risk is foreseeable. Id. The Restatement is
directly applicable to the section discussing the contribution on liability for mass action
lawsuits regarding environmental toxic torts. Id. “If an actor has skills or knowledge that
exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or knowledge are circumstances to be
taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved as a reasonably careful
person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 12 (2010). See also Garratt
v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1092–93 (Wash. 1955) (exemplifying the tort of battery and how
there was no issues of causation). In this case, a child defendant pulled a chair out from
underneath the plaintiff as she was about to sit. Id. at 1092. As a result, the plaintiff suffered
a severely injured hip. Id. In cases like this, where the defendant pulling the chair from
underneath the plaintiff directly caused the plaintiff to suffer a broken hip, courts do not
have to waste judicial resources litigating the causation element of negligence. Id. at 1093.
50
See Blomquist, supra note 49, 25–28 n.158, 30–31 n.169–71, 33–34, 36–37 (discussing the
issues of causation within toxic torts). Due to the problems with drawing a causal connection
between the source of the harm, the harm that resulted, and the impact of the harm, it makes
it challenging for courts to promote tort policies that seek to benefit the public. VINCENT R.
JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 6–7, (Gary J. Simson et al. eds., 5th ed. 2013).
51
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993) (discussing the issue
of whether expert scientific testimony is admissible in toxic tort proceedings). Due to the
problem of drawing a direct causal connection between the toxic substance and the resulting
harm, plaintiffs often rely on expert scientific testimony to help develop their proof. Id. at
582. One famous toxic tort case surrounding expert testimony is Daubert, where petitioners
sued for birth defects suffered by their children as a result of the mother ingesting Bendectin.
Id. Bendectin is a prescription antinausea drug marketed by the respondent of the suit. Id.
After extensive discovery, the respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the drug,
Bendectin, did not cause the birth defects and claimed the petitioners would not be able to
provide any admissible evidence that proves otherwise. Id. The respondent presented an
expert who reviewed the literature on Bendectin and could not find any correlation between
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Without knowing the cause of the harm, it is nearly impossible to
determine whether the environmental toxic torts arose out of the same
event or occurrence.52
2.

Tort Public Policy

Like much of tort law, the public policy surrounding environmental
torts cannot be defined by a succinct objective or goal.53 General tort
public policy has been known for compensating those who have been
detrimentally impacted by the act of another. 54 Nine of the twelve general
tort public policies are applicable to mass environmental torts and can be
categorized into three purposes: (1) to hold one liable based on their
the drug and birth defects among 130,000 human patients, and because of this testimony, the
petitioners presented their own expert who claimed that Benedictine could create birth
defects based on the testing of “in vitro” and “in vivo” animal studies. Id. Both the District
Court and Court of Appeals, relying on the case of Frye v. United States, held that the
petitioners’ evidence did not meet the standard of admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
583–84. However, the Supreme Court held that the rule in Frye of “general acceptance” does
not govern the admissibility of expert scientific evidence. Id. at 589. “General acceptance”
was a standard for admitting expert testimony that required “a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. App. Ct. 1923). However, Daubert overturned
this holding. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–88. The Supreme Court in Daubert stated “nothing in
the text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to
admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules
as a whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.” Id. at 588.
52
See infra Part III.A (considering the problem with causation and multiple party actions
in regards to the characteristics of environmental torts).
53
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–7 (explaining why there is a need to consider public
policy as applicable to general tort public policy).
54
See id. at 7–9 (suggesting twelve tort public policies that have traditionally applied to
tort law). Johnson provides twelve tort public policies that are applicable to tort lawsuits.
Id. The public policies are: (1) “[l]iability should be based on fault;” (2) “[l]iability should be
proportional to fault;” (3) “[l]iability should be used to deter accidents;” (4) “[t]he costs of
accidents should be spread broadly;” (5) “[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those
best able to bear them;” (6) “[t]hose who benefit from dangerous activities should bear
resulting losses;” (7) “[t]ort law should foster predictability in human affairs;” (8) “[t]ort law
should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit of progress;” (9) “[t]ort law should be
administratively convenient and efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries;” (10)
“[t]ort law should promote individual responsibility and discourage the waste of resources;”
(11) “[c]ourts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of government;” and (12)
“[a]ccident victims should be fully compensated.” Id. The tort public policies that are not
included in this section and are not evaluated in this Note are as follows: (1) “[t]he costs of
accidents should be spread broadly;” (2) “[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those
best able to bear them;” and (3) “[t]ort law should be administratively convenient and
efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries.” Id. While these are still important tort
public policies to consider when evaluating mass environmental torts, the remaining three
policies often interlink with the other policies and do not require their own analysis. Id.
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actions; (2) to benefit the general public; and (3) to promote economic
prudence.55
Within the first purpose, to hold one liable for their tortious actions,
tort public policy states that “liability should be based on fault,” which is
built upon the notion that liability should be imposed on the defendant
only if the defendant’s conduct is blameworthy. 56 The public policy
stating that “[t]ort law should promote individual responsibility and
discourage the waste of resources” is premised with the purpose of
discouraging the waste of judicial resources. 57 Individuals who have a
high risk for liability are encouraged to use the resources around them to
protect their interests and prevent harm, rather than waiting for the harm
to occur and relying on the judicial system to provide a remedy.58 The
final public policy that ensures individuals are held responsible for their
tortious actions states “those who benefit from dangerous activities
should bear [the] resulting losses” and is based on the principle of
culpability.59
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–9 (discussing the general tort public policies that are
applicable to environmental torts and the different categorical purposes the public polices
form for environmental law).
56
See id. at 7 (considering fault as a tort public policy and establishing the need to hold
one responsible for the harm he or she cause another). Tort public policy defines fault as a
situation where harm is the product of intentional conduct or failure to exercise the
appropriate amount of due care.
Id.
See also Fault, LAW DICTIONARY (2016),
http://thelawdictionary.org/fault/ [https://perma.cc/8DY6-5KND] (defining fault in a
civil lawsuit as “[a]n improper act or omission, injurious to another, and transpiring through
negligence, rashness, or ignorance” and explaining that there are three degrees of fault in
law).
57
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (exploring the concept of wasting judicial resources as
a deterrent and the promotion of sound tort public policy).
58
See id. (advocating for conserving judicial resources and arguing how the resolution of
the circuit split will help promote this public policy in the environmental field); see also Roger
Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 349, 349–50 (1978) (providing
the economic impact class actions have on the judicial system). Class actions face the issue
of aggregating small claims to one claim big enough so the potential recovery for the
plaintiffs outweighs the cost of litigation. Bernstein, supra note 58, at 349. However, many
opponents of class actions argue this wastes judicial resources because these small claims are
claims the plaintiffs would not have brought individually because the amount they could
recover is so insignificant compared to the cost of litigation. Id. Having vague legislative
regulations applicable to issues that already have a reputation of wasting judicial resources
further enforces that concept. Id.
59
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 8 (advocating for liability of those who assume risky
behaviors); see also Peter Clarke, Tort Law Liability, LEGALMATCH (2015), http://www.legal
match.com/law-library/article/tort-law-liability.html
[https://perma.cc/6UEL-HSUY]
(explaining the different theories of tort liability). Traditionally, tort law has many different
theories of liability. Clarke, supra note 59. Joint liability occurs when several tortfeasors are
held responsible for injury against one party. Id. The tortfeasors are jointly liable and are
required to pay based on their individual degree of liability. Id. Vicarious liability usually
occurs in the work place where someone in a superior position is responsible for the actions
55
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The second purpose of the nine applicable general tort public policies
is to promote these policies for the benefit of the public.60 The public
policy that “[l]iability should be used to deter accidents” seeks to
minimize, and potentially prevent, future accidents by discouraging
certain classes of individuals from engaging in conduct that poses a risk
of injury.61 To further benefit the public, “[t]ort law should foster
predictability in human affairs,” indicating a person should not be forced
to act without knowing what the law requires of them. 62 Finally,
“[a]ccident victims should be fully compensated” for the resulting harm
they suffer ensures individuals receive compensation for any accidents
they are not at fault for.63
of his or her subordinates. Id. Liability to third parties is another theory of liability, which
is most apparent in landlord-tenant relationships where a tortfeasor is held responsible for
injuries sustained by a third party. Id. Contributory negligence, also known as
plaintiff/victim liability, is a situation where the plaintiffs contributed to the harm that
resulted and are liable for the part of the harm that they caused. Id. Strict liability holds a
tortfeasor liable even if they had no intention to cause the resulting harm. Clark, supra note
59. Clarke discusses the theory of requiring that those who knowingly participate in harmful
or dangerous activities be held responsible for any harm that results from those dangerous
activities. Id.
60
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the three categories of tort public policy applicable to
environmental torts).
61
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7 (arguing that it is good public policy to deter accidents
and prevent harm).
62
See id. at 8 (providing the tort public policies); see also Cass, supra note 13, at 671 n.4
(stating that the Latin phrase ignorantia juris non exusat translates to ignorance of the law
excuses no one). To uphold this legal principle, courts should provide clear guidelines for
the parties to understand. See infra Part IV (discussing this Note’s proposed contribution).
63
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (exploring why “[a]ccident victims should be fully
compensated”); see also Ken LaMance, Remedies in Tort Law, LEGALMATCH (2015),
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/remedies-in-tort-law.html
[https://perma.cc/P43D-L83B] (explaining the different forms of compensation in tort law
available to plaintiffs). Compensation comes in many forms in tort law. LaMance, supra note
63. A victim of a tort can receive damages, which are monetary payments to compensate for
any injuries, losses, and pain and suffering. Id. Punitive damages, which are damages used
to punish and deter the negligent conduct, may be included as well. Id. There are also
restitutionary remedies. Id. Restitutionary damages are similar to monetary damages;
however, they are calculated based on the tortfeasor’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss. Id.
Replevin allows the plaintiff to recover property that may have been lost because of the tort.
Id. Ejectment removes a person staying on real property owned by the plaintiff, and is
usually only present in trespass torts. LaMance, supra note 63. Courts may also put a
property lien, which is a method of compensating a plaintiff for his or her harm through the
sale of the tortfeasor’s property. Id. A third category of remedies is equitable remedies,
which comes into play when monetary damages will not suffice as adequate compensation.
Id. Equitable remedies include temporary restraining orders, which prevent the tortfeasor
from contacting or coming near the plaintiff, and temporary or permanent injunctions, which
may prohibit the tortfeasor’s activity or may order a tortfeasor to take affirmative steps. Id.
Generally, for environmental torts, courts only consider compensatory and punitive
damages. Id.
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The final purpose of general tort public policy is to encourage
economic prudence.64 Environmental catastrophes and vague statutory
definitions do not encourage economic prudence and violate the policy
that “[t]ort law should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit of
progress.”65 To further promote economic prudence, courts need to
recognize certain questions are generally best left to the legislature to
remedy in a statute, rather than relying on the judicial branch to resolve
in litigation.66 Therefore, “[c]ourts should accord due deference to coequal branches of government,” ensuring that the judicial and legislative
branches are in a balance ultimately promoting economic prudence.67
Currently, these nine tort public policies are not adequately
considered in the current interpretation of the CAFA and the same event
or occurrence language.68 Tort public policy should be promoted for the
safety and health of the citizens who could potentially be impacted by
these environmental catastrophes.69 Thus, for the benefits of tort public
policy and to alleviate the confusion amongst the parties and the judicial
system, a more precise definition of same event or occurrence is needed. 70
B. The History of the Class Action Fairness Act
Cases that involve large numbers of plaintiffs or defendants are
known as class actions.71 Today, the function of a class action lawsuit is
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–7 (discussing the three categories of tort public policy
applicable to the environmental torts and the issue of removal jurisdiction and arguing for
the need to resolve the circuit split to promote these public policies).
65
See id. at 9 (advocating economic growth and arguing that the promotion of economic
growth is one form of tort public policy).
66
See id. (encouraging the balance of the judicial and legislative branches of government).
67
See id. (promoting co-equal branches of government and requiring that defendants take
action to prevent their harm, rather than waste judicial resources by relying on the court to
determine the damages).
68
See infra Part II.B (demonstrating how the CAFA fails to adequately define the same
event or occurrence exception).
69
See infra Part II.C (exemplifying situations where parties were detrimentally harmed by
environmental catastrophes).
70
See infra Part IV (providing the factor test courts should adopt to eliminate the vague
standard of the same event or occurrence exception under the CAFA).
71
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2005) (explaining what
is a class action under the CAFA); see also McCastle v. Rollins Envt’l Servs. of La., Inc., 456
So. 2d 612, 615 (La. 1984) (holding that a class action was an appropriate form of suit that
was brought before the Louisiana state court and exemplifying a situation of a class action
lawsuit). In McCastle, there were approximately 4,000 residents who lived near a hazardous
waste disposal facility owned by Rollins Environmental Services. McCastle, 456 So. 2d at 615
The plaintiffs alleged that from March 6, 1980 to February 21, 1981, the land farming
operation produced chemical fumes that caused the plaintiffs’ illnesses and discomfort with
burning eyes, sore throats, and upset stomachs, while increasing the risk of asthma, cancer,
and heart disease. Id.
64
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to prevent plaintiffs’ remedies from being limited simply because the rules
of court restrict their ability to bring a claim. 72 Class actions, rooted in
English courts, were created to combat common problems in multiparty
lawsuits.73 Taking from the equitable principles found in English law, the
American court system sought to provide a remedy in law and equity to
those harmed in class actions.74 Eventually, the United States adopted
Equity Rule 38, a rewritten version of the English Equity Rule 48. 75 Equity
72
See West v. Randall, 29 F.Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (discussing the rights of
defendants to a claim and interested parties in a lawsuit); see also Brown v. W. & G. Ricketts,
3 Johns.Ch. 553, 555–56 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (discussing the issue of whether certain parties can
be involved in the claim brought).
73
See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 3 (Samantha
Cassetta et al. eds., 2010) (discussing generally how to litigate class actions). Class actions
have not always existed in American law and the legislation regarding class actions is based
on English law. Id. Many problems may arise with single-plaintiff lawsuits. Id. First,
separate lawsuits may lead to inconsistent outcomes. Id. This means a court may rule two
different ways in cases that are factually similar. Id. These inconsistencies can degrade the
view of the American judicial system as one legislative body because it raises a question of
fairness. Id. Second, requiring separate lawsuits for claims that may be against the same
defendant causes individuals to waste their economic resources. ANDERSON & TRASK, supra
note 73, at 3. Litigation is expensive because, for example, it requires hiring an attorney to
research elements of a claim, hiring appropriate experts, and reviewing documents and other
pieces of evidence. Id. See also West, 29 F.Cas. at 721 (discussing the laws of equity). When
developing a class action, English courts considered all persons with an interest in the subject
matter of a suit a necessary party and one that could be involved in the lawsuit. Id. at 718.
See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 803 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (exemplifying
a situation of multiparty litigation).
74
See West, 29 F.Cas. at 721 (quoting Justice Joseph Story who stated that “[i]t is a general
rule in equity, that all persons materially interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the
subject matter of the bill ought to be made parties in the suit, however numerous they may
be.”). Justice Story listed three exceptions in regards to the general rule that all interested
parties to the suit should be involved. Id. at 722. The first exception is if there are numerous
parties, it will be almost impossible to bring them all before the court. Id. The second
exception to the rule is if the question is of general interest, a few may sue for the benefit of
the whole. Id. The final exception is if the parties form part of a voluntary association, they
may represent the rights and interests of the whole. Id. For those harmed, courts have
traditionally been interested in promoting equitable relief by providing the opportunity to
present the case. Id. at 718; see also Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68
VAND. L. REV. 997, 998–99 (2015) (considering the laws of equity and how the courts evaluate
equity when adjudicating issues and reaching a remedy).
75
See Clarke v. Boysen, 285 F. 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1922) (providing the language for Equity
Rule 48). Equity Rule 48 states that:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought
before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with making all of
them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties
before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the
defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases, the decree
shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent
parties.
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Rule 38 provided that when the issue before the court is one of common
or general interest to many persons, so that it would be impracticable to
bring them all before the court individually, then one or two individuals
may sue or defend on behalf of the whole group. 76 Over time, American
courts have found if there were numerous parties, it would be
impracticable to bring them all into court, but if these parties had a
common interest and adequate representation in the claim filed, the courts
had a willingness to allow cases to proceed as class actions. 77
Before the enactment of the CAFA, the courts considered many
environmental regulations and rules when adjudicating environmental
torts to prevent corruption that may occur with complex litigation. 78 The
Id.
See also Class Action, LEGAL INFO. INST. (2015), https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/class_action [https://perma.cc/4DSD-FN3L] (evaluating how class suits apply to
the rules of equity and providing the language for Equity Rule 48). Equity rules are a group
of rights and procedures set in place to provide fairness. Equity, LAW.COM (2015),
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=646
[https://perma.cc/76NS-2NQD].
The rules of equity arose in England in response to the strict rules of common law. Id. The
courts of chancery, also known as the courts of equity, were established to provide remedies
through royal power that common law did not provide. Id. The courts of law and the courts
of equity were separate during that time in England; however, the two usually combined
and were treated under the same cause of action. Id. See Daniel K. Hopkinson, The New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin
Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 170 (1939) (providing Equity Rule 38, which combined the
previous language in Smith and Equity Rule 48 that helped form F.R.C.P. 23 surrounding
class actions).
76
See Hopkins, supra note 75, at 170 (discussing Equity Rule 38, which is the rule the
United States chose to adopt based on the English Rules of Equity). Equity Rule 38 states
that:
[T]he test to be applied to representative suits was that the question
should be one of common or general interest to many persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (explaining the requirements for joining parties into one action);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (providing the requirements for consolidating multiple claims
into one action).
78
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (c) (1972) (governing water pollution on a
federal level); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (providing a way to mitigate and
deter future oil spills in the United States); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (1963)
(standardizing a method of controlling air pollution on a national level); National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (promoting the enhancement of the
environment); see also Timeline:
The Modern Environmental Movement, PBS (2016),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/earthdays/
[https://perma.cc/8HGT-QUV4] (providing that throughout the 1970s, the legislature
adopted environmental statutes and regulations to protect the environment and promote
public safety as a public policy argument). On January 1, 1970, the Court adopted the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, requiring federal agencies to consider the
environmental consequences of their actions and disclose those impacts to the public to help
deter future harms. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. The Clean Air Amendment of 1970 sought to protect
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federal courts adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“F.R.C.P.”) because the environmental regulations failed to assist in the
adjudication of a class action claim.79 F.R.C.P. 23 is one of the earlier
examples of the judicial system’s attempt to address litigation of class
actions, and it provides four conditions that allow a claim to be considered
a class action.80 The first condition requires the size of the class to be so
large that joinder is not possible. 81 The next requirement is that the class
presents a common question of law and fact.82 The third requirement
provides that the representatives in the lawsuit must present claims and
defenses of those that are typical of that class of individuals.83 Finally, the
public health by providing air quality standards for people to know when the air is
considered unsafe for humans and hazardous to the environment. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. In 1990,
the Oil Pollution Act aspired to remedy the gaps found in the Clean Water Act of 1977 and
the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972. § 2701. The Oil Pollution Act was directed at
companies who are at a high liability for spilling oil into the United States waterways and
required that companies have a plan to prevent the spills and a detailed plan outlining the
actions the company would take in the event of an oil spill. Id. See also Alexandra Lahav,
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (2003) (discussing
the procedural problems that arise with complex litigation procedure such as class actions).
79
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (listing guidelines for a judge to determine if the prerequisites
for a class action have been met).
80
See id. (providing the prerequisites for a class action). F.R.C.P. 23 further requires the
following to have a successful class action: there is a risk of inconsistent rulings; the interests
of others are similar; the defendants have not behaved in a manner the class bringing the
action expects; the claims of the class have a common question of law or fact; and that a class
action is superior to other methods of adjudication to have a class action. See also FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b) (describing the different types of class actions that may arise); see also Sarah Somers,
7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY L.
(2014),
http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42
[https://perma.cc/ZXV8-JDSX]
(reviewing the requirements, under F.R.C.P 23, for class certification).
81
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that the class be so broad and encompassing that
it is impractical to join the members of the claim); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (discussing
when parties may be joined in one action). Joinder is a situation in which several lawsuits,
or several parties, may be combined in one lawsuit so long as the issues and facts in the case
are the same. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
82
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (ensuring that the class action involves the same issue
between all the plaintiffs); see also Stephen A. Wiener, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1867–68 (1966) (discussing the distinction between law
and fact). Questions of facts are issues that are to be resolved by the jury, whereas questions
of law are issues that are to be resolved by the judge. Id. at 1867.
83
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (suggesting that the claims and defenses the parties may bring
are common to the claim). Some common defenses in toxic torts are: the plaintiff has not
proved the elements necessary for the claim, the defendant has not caused the resulting
harm, the defendant has complied with government regulations and should not be held
liable, the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm, and the statute of limitations has run out. See
Kathleen Michon, Toxic Tort Litigation:
Common Defenses, NOLO (2015),
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/toxic-tort-litigation-common-defenses-32209.
html [https://perma.cc/2G7T-5SZ8] (establishing some of the common defenses of toxic
torts that defendants may raise in litigation).
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representatives must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.84 However, this rule did not alleviate the problems of forum
shopping and other mass litigation problems. 85
The law has not been without attempt to provide an adequate solution
for proper litigation of mass environmental torts, and in response to the
past failures, former President George W. Bush signed the CAFA into law
on February 17, 2005.86 The CAFA’s purpose is to ensure fair and prompt
recoveries for plaintiffs with multiple claims, restore the intent of those
who drafted the Constitution by providing federal court jurisdiction over
cases of national importance, and benefit society by encouraging
innovation and lowering consumer prices.87 As such, the CAFA
supplements F.R.C.P. 23 and provides a way for parties to remove an
action to federal court.88
The CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar state statute or rule of
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (allowing the classes to act as a representative for everyone
who is an interested class member).
85
See Lahav, supra note 78, at 65–66 n.3 (providing a guide that discusses complex
litigation procedure); see also Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 (1998) (exemplifying some of
the problems associated with circuit splits).
86
See Lahav, supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous
environmental regulations to help deter environmental catastrophes); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) (providing a piece of legislation used to aid courts in adjudicating class actions); Marcy
Hogan Greer & Paul L. Peyronnin, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 241 (Marcy Hogan Greer et al. eds., 2010) (stating the Act was
enacted in response to abuse in class action litigation stated in the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report). Commenting on the purpose of the Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report stated:
One key reason for the problems with our existing class action system is
that most class actions are currently adjudicated in state courts, where
the governing rules are applied inconsistently (frequently in a manner
that contravenes basic fairness and due process considerations) and
where there is often inadequate supervision over litigation procedures
and proposed settlements.
Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241. Those who ratified the CAFA have ultimately
concluded that states are not able to adequately handle massive, multistate class actions. Id.
at 242. Thus, Congress created a law that alleviated some of the claims states would be
required to hear. Id.
87
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (explaining the purposes of the CAFA are to “(1) assure fair
and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and (3) benefit society by
encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices”).
88
See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (discussing class action lawsuits and defining a class action as “any
civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute
or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action”).
84
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judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by [one] or more
representative persons.”89 By comparison, under § 1332(d) of the CAFA,
federal courts have minimal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with
100 or more individual class members whose amount in controversy
exceeds more than $5 million.90 The CAFA defines a mass action as “any
civil action [where] . . . [the] claims of 100 or more persons are proposed
to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common
questions of law or fact.”91 As such, a mass action is deemed to be a class
action and removable under the United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
§§ 1332(d)(2)-(10).92 However, the CAFA provides an exception to this
rule.93 Under the CAFA, a mass action does not exist if “all the claims in
the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the action
was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States
contiguous to that state.”94 While this exception is helpful for the purposes
89
See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (defining a class action as any civil action filed under Rule 23 of the
F.R.C.P. authorizing an action to be brought by one or more representative persons); see also
§ 1711(2) (providing another instance in which a class action is defined); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)
(establishing guidelines for litigating mass actions as class actions).
90
See § 1332 (providing the sections of the United States Code where the CAFA is
codified); see also § 1332(a) (discussing non-class action federal jurisdiction requiring that the
parties be of diverse citizenship, meaning that the parties involved in the lawsuit must be
citizens of different states, and requiring the amount in controversy to exceed $75,000).
91
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i); see also Civil Action, LAW DICTIONARY (2015), http://thelaw
dictionary.org/civil-action/ [https://perma.cc/U2QT-VUXV] (explaining that a civil action
is a lawsuit in civil law where there is a personal action instituted to compel payment or
doing something else that is purely civil in nature).
92
See § 1332(d)(11)(A) (describing a mass action generally). Mass actions can be removed
as class actions under the CAFA because class actions are an area of law that federal courts
have jurisdiction over. § 1332(d)(2).
93
See § 1332(d)(3), § 1332(d)(4), § 1332(d)(11) (explaining exceptions of claims that come
within the CAFA). Under the CAFA there are additional exceptions for mass actions. Id.
This Note focuses on only one exception for mass actions—what constitutes the same event
or occurrence for a mass action to be a class action—and thus, removable to federal court as
a class action. See supra Part II.A (considering the characteristics of environmental torts).
However, there are additional limitations to federal court jurisdiction of mass actions under
the CAFA. § 1332(d)(11)(B). The first limitation of mass actions and federal jurisdiction is
the federal court has the discretion to choose whether to exercise jurisdiction over a mass
action when more than one-third, but fewer than two-thirds, of the members of citizens of
the foreign states and the primary defendants are also citizens of the forum state.
§ 1332(d)(3). Furthermore, a district court is required to decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or
more of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state.
§ 1332(d)(4)(B). Another instance where the district court is required to decline jurisdiction
over a mass action is when the principal injuries resulting from the conduct at issue occurred
in the forum state or where no similar class action involving any of the same defendants was
filed during the three-year period before the filing of the complaint at issue. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
94
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). Also, a mass action is not considered a class action if:
the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; all of the claims in the
action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of
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of removal jurisdiction, the phrase “same event or occurrence” is vague in
the context of environmental torts.95 The vagueness of the single local
event exception can be further exemplified by the three-way circuit split
of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits. 96
C. The Circuit Split
Circuit splits are generally disfavored because they create inconsistent
holdings and confuse the parties and prospective litigants.97 Recently, the
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit courts evaluated the issue of whether a
mass action is a class action under the single local event exception. 98 These
three circuits provided different interpretations of what was considered
the same event or occurrence phrase, thereby creating inconsistent
holdings surrounding environmental torts.99
In the Third Circuit ruling, Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group,
L.L.L.P., over 500 individual plaintiffs sued because of an aluminum
refinery’s negligent operation, which harmed the plaintiffs’ health and
land.100 When the defendants attempted to remove the action to federal
court, the plaintiffs sought to remand the case back to the state court
arguing that federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a
State statute specifically authorizing such action; or the claims have
been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II)–(IV).
95
See infra Part III.A (evaluating the CAFA and critiquing the vague language of the single
local event exception).
96
See infra Part III (addressing the problems with the vagueness of the same event or
occurrence phrase); see also infra Part IV (providing a solution to the vague language of the
CAFA’s single local event exception).
97
See infra Part III.A (critiquing circuit splits through the lens of tort public policy); see also
Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Court of Appeals, YALE UNIV. (May
12,
2015),
http://campuspress.yale.edu/beim/files/2011/10/Beim_Rader_Conflictsxxkfk0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRZ7-ADQB] (recognizing the reasons for circuit splits and
evaluating how long circuit split conflicts exist before they are resolved).
98
See infra Part II.C (discussing three recent examples of the single local event exception
under the CAFA).
99
See infra Part II.C (commenting on the three-way circuit split and courts’ interpretations
of the CAFA).
100
See 719 F.3d 270, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the continued release of hazardous
materials over a period of time is a single event). St. Croix Renaissance Group (“SCRG”)
owned an aluminum refinery, and the plaintiffs asserted that for thirty years, as a result of
the refinery’s operations, hazardous materials were buried in red mud and stored outdoors
in piles up to 120 feet high and spreading over 190 acres of land. Id. at 272–73. Apart from
these hazardous materials, friable asbestos was also present. Id. at 273. The wind dispersed
these chemicals causing erosion. Id. The plaintiffs argue that SCRG knew gusts of wind
could easily disburse the red mud and that plaintiffs and their property could be subject to
damage because of the red mud, but did nothing to combat it. Id.
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mass action fell under the single local event exception. 101 The court found
that “[t]he word event . . . is not always confined to a discrete happening
that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion, hurricane[,] or
chemical spill.”102 As such, the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that an
environmental hazard that is continuing in nature might fit the “event”
element of the single local event exception of the CAFA.103
In the Ninth Circuit ruling of Allen v. The Boeing Company, the plaintiffs
filed an action against Boeing, Landau, and fifty John Does alleging
property damage due to groundwater contamination spanning over a
fifty-three-year period.104 Boeing removed the action to the federal court
on the basis that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear the claim
because the claim was a mass action. 105 The plaintiffs then motioned to
remand the issue back to state court, arguing the claim fell under the single

101
See id. at 272 (stating where the claim was original filed); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
(providing that a defense motion must be filed under this rule when a party is trying to
dismiss a claim for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). A court must have jurisdiction to
have authority to enforce a judgment on a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Subject-matter
jurisdiction is one type of jurisdiction that allows a claim to be heard in federal court. Id.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the requirement that the court has the power to hear the specific
kind of claim brought to the court. Id. If courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction, they
must dismiss the case. Id. Class actions are an example of claims that federal courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction over due to their complex nature; therefore, if a mass action is not
a class action, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over the claim. Id.
102
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (emphasis in original). The first step is to determine whether
the particular language has a plain and unambiguous meaning regarding the dispute in the
case. Id. If the meaning of the statutory text is plain, then there is no further inquiry. Id.
103
See id. (concluding that a continuing event may still be the same event). The District
Court noted that the word event used in the CAFA could encompass a continuing tort, for
example, the continuous release of a toxic chemical. Id. The District Court reasoned that
using a narrow view, like what SCRG wanted to argue, would undermine the intent of
Congress to allow state courts to adjudicate claims involving truly localized torts with
localized injuries. Id. To illustrate this, the District Court stated that:
[T]he word event in our view is not always confined to a discrete
happening that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion,
hurricane, or chemical spill. For example, one can speak of the Civil War
as a defining event in American history, even though it took place over
a four-year period and involved many battles.
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (emphasis in original). The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s
reasoning. Id. at 280.
104
See 784 F.3d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a single event is limited to a single
happening). Landau was the environmental remediation contractor for Boeing and the
plaintiffs asserted that Landau was liable for negligently investigating, remediating, and
cleaning up the contamination, and for failing to warn plaintiffs of the contamination. Id.
105
See id. at 627–28 (discussing the removal procedure); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)
(2012) (providing that so long as the action is considered a mass action under the CAFA, then
the case may be removed to federal court).
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local event exception and the local controversy exception of the CAFA. 106
Ultimately, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the single event or
occurrence exclusion only applies where “all claims arise from a single
event or occurrence.”107
Finally, in the Fifth Circuit, Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore,
L.L.C., a group of 167 individuals brought a negligence claim against
Denbury Onshore for injuries incurred thirteen years prior. 108 Denbury
moved to remove the action to federal court under the CAFA, and the
plaintiffs moved to remand the motion, claiming that the single local event
exclusion applied.109 The Fifth Circuit held that the ongoing patterns of
conduct were contextually connected, and therefore resulted in one event,
See Allen, 784 F.3d at 628–30, 633 (evaluating the motion on remand); see also Coleman
v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1010–17 (9th Cir. 2011) (providing the precedent
case the Ninth Circuit relied on in Allen). In Coleman, the court stated a plaintiff seeking
remand under this exception has the burden of showing that the exception applies and
indicated that issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Coleman, 631 F.3d at
1013–14. Coleman further holds “that CAFA’s language unambiguously directs the district
court to look only to the complaint in deciding whether the criteria set forth in
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa) and (bb) are satisfied.” Id. at 1015. The court in Coleman offered
three reasons for courts not looking beyond the complaint to determine whether a case
satisfies the requirements of subsections (aa) and (bb). Id. at 1016. The first requirement
states that “the plain language of these subsections indicates, through the use of the words
‘sought’ and ‘alleged,’ that the district court is to look to the complaint rather than to extrinsic
evidence.” Id. The second requirement states “though district courts sometimes consider
evidence in making some subject matter jurisdiction determinations, they do not always do
so.” Id. The final requirement states “factual determinations under subsections (aa) and (bb)
are likely to be more expensive and time consuming than factual determinations of
citizenship and amount-in-controversy.” Id. at 1016. The court in Coleman concluded that
“nothing in CAFA . . . indicates a congressional intention to turn a jurisdictional
determination concerning the local defendant’s ‘alleged conduct’ into a mini-trial on the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.” Coleman, 631 F.3d at 1017. While this is not the section
addressed in this Note, it provides some understanding as to how to interpret the language
of the CAFA.
107
See Allen, 784 F.3d. at 628–29 (emphasis omitted) (deciding on the definition of the same
event or occurrence). Previously, on September 23, 2014, the District Court for the Western
District of Washington ruled that the single local event applied, and thus, the federal court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 628.
108
See 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that there was no single event within this
lawsuit for the purposes of remanding the case back to state court). The 167 individuals
entered into a contract with Denbury Onshore, Specter Exploration, and SKH Energy
allowing them to explore for oil, gas, and hydrocarbons on their land. Id. at 407. The
plaintiffs brought a suit stating that Denbury had breached its duty as a lessee to “act as a
reasonable and prudent operator of the well.” Id. They further alleged that Denbury failed
to: follow methods that were designed to prevent the drill pipe from getting stuck,
adequately “cement the casing in a sidetrack well,” “heed increased differential pressures in
the drilling of the original well,” and correct a defective cement job. Id.
109
See id. at 407 (describing the procedural history of the case, stating the district court
found that the case fell under the single local event exception, and therefore, remanded the
case back to the state court for further proceedings).
106
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so the single local event exception applied.110 The three-way circuit split
reveals that there is a need for an adequately defined standard for what is
considered the same event or occurrence.111
III. ANALYSIS
The current legal language of the CAFA does not provide a clear
definition or explanation of the single local event exception, as evidenced
by the three-way circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits. 112 The
individual circuits provided guidance on what constitutes the same event
or occurrence in a mass environmental tort; however, federal courts
should forego the Circuits’ previous rulings defining the same event or
occurrence because they do not successfully consider the context of mass
environmental torts.113 Instead, federal courts should adopt a balancing
factor test that will allow for environmental tort claims to be evaluated
under the same standard.114 As such, Part III.A analyzes the manners in
which the CAFA and other environmental regulations fail to adequately
consider removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts.115 Next, Part
III.B examines circuit splits and shows how they generally deter courts
from promoting sound public policy.116
A. The Trouble with the CAFA and Other Regulations
Currently, under the CAFA, no unified standard or definitional
phrase is provided for courts when they are interpreting removal
jurisdiction of mass environmental torts. 117 Originally, the CAFA and
other mass action legislation was enacted to prevent corruption in
multiparty litigation, but these pieces of legislation fail to accomplish that

110
See id. at 413 (finding that the district court did not err, and instead affirmed the decision
that the case came within the single local event exception).
111
See supra Part II.C (exploring the holdings of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits
regarding the CAFA and removal jurisdiction of mass actions).
112
See supra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA and the definitions and standards provided
within the legislation).
113
See supra Part II.B (reiterating the holdings of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and
composing their standards for what the same event or occurrence is under the CAFA).
114
See supra Part II.C (illustrating the specific facts of the cases involved circuit splits); see
also infra Part IV (proposing a four-factor balancing test for courts to adopt).
115
See infra Part III.A (evaluating the CAFA and arguing how it inadequately promotes the
original purpose of the CAFA through the removal of mass actions).
116
See infra Part III.B (analyzing circuit splits generally, and then critiquing the specific
circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits).
117
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (describing the single local event exception and
discussing when a mass action is a class action to be removed to federal court under the
CAFA).
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purpose.118 A vague standard for removal jurisdiction, under the CAFA,
aggravates many policy areas of tort law by failing to use liability as a
means to deter accidents.119
Additionally, forum shopping is another consequence that results
from vague legislation, like the CAFA, because it encourages parties to
remove a lawsuit from state court to federal court seeking more favorable
treatment.120 In mass environmental tort litigation, a party may seek to
remove a case to or from federal court simply because that forum could
provide the party with a more favorable outcome. 121 However, in reality,
that forum may have no legal authority to adjudicate the case in the first
place.122 Forum shopping violates tort public policy and the legislative
intent of the CAFA.123 As such, adopting specific guidelines at the federal
118
See Herald, supra note 85, at 431 (describing the problems associated with circuit splits,
specifically considering the Ninth Circuit); see also ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3
(exploring the different types of corruption that can occur in complex litigation, such as
forum shopping, inconsistent judgments, issues of equity and fairness, and the waste of
economic resources); supra Part II.C (providing the facts used to create the three-way circuit
split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit); infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the problems that
result from circuit splits and how they can impact the litigation of a claim).
119
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (discussing the twelve general tort public policies
that should be promoted when litigating environmental torts).
120
See Bassett, supra note 40, at 335.
(examining forum shopping as a problem involved in complex litigation); see also Judicial
Selection: The Process of Choosing Judges, ABA 5, 8 (June 2008), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/Justice/PublicDocuments/judicial_sel
ection_roadmap.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULQ9-HU4K] [hereinafter Judicial
Selection] (exploring the election of state judges and their duties to the public). There has
been much debate that one of the reasons parties forum shop is to avoid the potential bias of
state judges because they are elected for limited terms and to serve the public. Judicial
Selection, supra note 120, at 5. Many believe state judges should not enter rulings based on
the interest of the public, but instead should rule in the interest of the law. Id. at 8.
Furthermore, incentives are provided to a plaintiff who settles because F.R.C.P. 68(d)
requires that a plaintiff who refuses to settle must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs if the
final judgment is less than the unaccepted offer. F.R.C.P. 68(d). In regards to the payment
to the plaintiff for the resulting harm, post-judgment interest rates are monitored by federal
law and are often significantly less than state post-judgment interest rates. 18 U.S.C. § 3612
(2012). There are other reasons why a defendant favors federal court over state court;
however, these were the ones that are most apparent. Id.
121
See Bassett, supra note 40, at 342 (exploring the concept of forum shopping and the
corruption associated with forum shopping because it is easier for parties to seek to file in
the court that they know may give them a more favorable ruling).
122
Id. at 344 (exemplifying that there is the possibility of being able to legally bring a claim
in two forums). While there is legal authority to bring a claim under jurisdiction and venue
requirements outlined in the F.R.C.P., this Note focuses more on selecting one forum over
another, specifically based on how a judge may litigate a case, making it more burdensome
on the defendant who does not get to select the forum. Id. at 346.
123
See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241–42 (explaining the purpose of the CAFA
and describing the inconsistent adjudication process without the CAFA); see also JOHNSON,
supra note 50, at 7–9 (discussing tort public policy); supra Part II.A.2 (evaluating the specific
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court level will eliminate forum shopping because parties will not be able
to skew the facts or the evidence of their case to seek a favorable ruling
that aligns with that specific court’s approach. 124 Instead, federal courts
should apply a unified standard to all environmental toxic tort claims for
what constitutes the same event or occurrence under the single local event
exception.125 Using the unified standard, courts will be able to determine
whether a claim is properly removable to federal court. 126
Furthermore, under the current language of the CAFA, the failure to
provide a standard for the same event or occurrence violates the drafters’
legislative intent, as well as tort public policy.127 Congress enacted
numerous environmental regulations to protect the people and the
environment.128 Therefore, to promote the legislative intent of the
environmental policies enacted, defendants who fail to abide by the
regulations and fail to prevent any resulting harm must be held liable.129
The implementation of different environmental regulations are aimed at

tort public policies that are applicable to mass environmental torts). The CAFA sought to
combat the problems often associated with complex litigation, and vague standards do not
remedy the apparent problems of forum shopping and public policy violations. Supra Part
II.A.
124
See Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–54 n.9 (illustrating how forum shopping works in
favor of litigants); see also infra Part IV (providing a solution aimed at eliminating corruption
within the judicial system).
125
See Cummins & Aft, supra note 23, at 60 (discussing how circuit splits work and their
impact on the Supreme Court).
126
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2012) (stating that a mass action is considered a class
action under the CAFA when the claim does not arise out of the same event or occurrence,
thus giving federal courts jurisdiction over the mass action as if it were a class action).
127
See Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2015)
(exemplifying a case that considers the local controversy exception, which is an exception
applied to a class action). The single local event exception differs from the local controversy
exception because the single local event exception is a narrowly tailored rule. Id. at 1115.
128
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (c) (1972) (advocating for the minimization of
water pollution on a national scale); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (construing a
document to be used to help deter oil spills and more effectively clean up oil spills that
occur); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (recommending
regulations to promote a clean environment); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (1963)
(urging the regulation of air pollutants). These environmental regulations were enacted
before the CAFA to aid in combating the problems associated with the environment and to
ensure that parties who fail to abide by states’ regulatory requirements are held responsible
for their actions. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circuit courts’ holdings regarding the
same event or occurrence phrase).
129
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–8 (saying that those who choose to engage in risky
behavior should bear the resulting losses and incur liability in proportion to their actions).
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discouraging certain classes of people from engaging in forms of conduct
that pose an excessive risk of personal injury or property damage. 130
In addition, vague legislation distracts the judge from issues such as
liability of the defendant and recovery of the plaintiff, and shifts the focus
to procedural issues, which is unfavorable for public policy. 131 When a
defendant chooses to forego statutory regulations, such as environmental
regulations, a negligence action is brought and the court analyzes the
defendant’s conduct under two different theories of negligence: a
negligence per se action or a breach of duty under the traditional
negligence theory.132 The theory of negligence and element causation in a
mass environmental tort case are the important issues that courts must
address; however, because of the vague language of the CAFA, the courts
instead must address issues of removal jurisdiction of mass
A unified standard to apply to removal
environmental torts.133
jurisdiction under the CAFA will allow the court to focus on the issue of
the defendant’s intent and care, which will better hold tortfeasors liable
for the resulting harm that could have been prevented or minimized. 134
Finally, the CAFA also fails to account for the fact specific nature of
toxic tort claims.135 Due to the specific nature of such claims, it is more
challenging for the court to consistently apply a rule that is too narrow or
130
See id. at 6–7 (exploring tort public policy and providing that one public policy is to
deter accidents and prevent individuals from engaging in conduct that is at a high risk of
negligence).
131
See id. at 7–10 (noting the importance of public policy). Vague legislation does not
promote public policy because it hinders and delays the plaintiff’s potential recovery. Id. at
9–10.
132
See Negligence Per Se in a Personal Injury Case, ALLLAW (2015), http://www.alllaw.com/
articles/nolo/personal-injury/negligence-per-se.html [https://perma.cc/7ZLM-LMMN]
(explaining that a personal injury lawsuit, such as a toxic tort lawsuit, may be brought under
a cause of action claim or a regular personal injury litigation claim). Environmental laws are
designed to protect the public. Id. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), (c) (standardizing water
pollution on a national scale); 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (suggesting a way to remedy oil spills and
prevent future oil spills from occurring); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (encouraging the promotion of a
safe and clean environment); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b)–(c) (controlling the amount of air
pollutants on a national scale).
133
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (exploring the traditional rules for proving factual
causation); see also Clarke, supra note 59 (reviewing the different theories of liability found
within tort law).
134
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (arguing that a tortfeasor should be liable for any
resulting harm that he or she caused and providing the twelve tort public policies that are
applied to the general category of tort law).
135
See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014)
(describing one of the few times federal courts have ruled on the issue of removal jurisdiction
of a mass action under the CAFA); see also Lin, supra note 34, at 1441–42, 1445–46 (stating that
the two common hurdles for plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation are the latency period where the
plaintiff proves that an actual harm has occurred and proving the defendant actually caused
the harm).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6

Myers: Removing the Mass Misperception: A Consideration of Mass Environm

2016]

Mass Misperception

189

too broad, such as the Ninth Circuit ruling and the Third Circuit ruling. 136
As such, a factor test is the most appropriate; it allows the courts to have
discretion when hearing these cases, which is important because
environmental laws are more fact specific when they are being litigated.137
A unified standard is needed, because it allows for an equitable solution
while considering the fact specific nature of environmental torts. 138 The
presence of a circuit split regarding what constitutes the same event or
occurrence under the CAFA is not surprising. 139 Courts want to ensure
that the rule they are applying is fair and equitable for the cause, which is
why the legislature enacted the CAFA; however, the vague language in
the Act does little to promote fair and equitable adjudication of toxic tort
litigation and removal jurisdiction. 140 Therefore, courts need to adopt a
unified standard to ensure that the environmental torts do actually arise
out of the same event or occurrence, promoting the legislative intent of the
CAFA and allowing courts to contextually analyze truly localized
claims.141
B. The Trouble with Circuit Splits and Toxic Torts
Circuit splits have created many problems and have never been
favored among courts, judges, or litigants because such splits create
See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (narrowing the Third Circuit’s
view of the CAFA exception); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d
405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (clarifying the Third and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of the CAFA);
Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting
the exception under the CAFA broadly); Veron, supra note 44, at 647–48 (reviewing how toxic
tort litigation and its fact specific nature has changed over time since the Daubert case). The
latter three cases exemplify the apparent need to better define the same event or occurrence
to resolve the circuit split. See, e.g., Allen, 784 F.3d at 633 (limiting the interpretation of the
CAFA exception made by the Abraham Court); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., L.L.C., 760 F.3d at 407
(resolving the mixed interpretations of the CAFA provided by the Third and Ninth Circuits);
Abraham, 719 F.3d at 272 (taking a broad approach to the CAFA exception).
137
See Rice, supra note 38, at 885, 887–89 (arguing that because of the fact specific nature of
toxic torts, the fictitious defendant problem arises); see also Franklin, supra note 33 (showing
how environmental catastrophes can be fact specific and determining the resulting harm is
based on the facts).
138
See supra Part II.A (exemplifying generally the characteristics of the environmental
torts); see also Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (stating the problems of causation and the duty of
the plaintiff in alleging the resulting harm).
139
See supra Part II.C (addressing the three cases that caused a three-way circuit split). The
Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits all provide valid arguments for what constitutes the same
event or occurrence, but the unclear approach and the split among the Circuits is what makes
litigation challenging. See supra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the Circuits for their different
interpretations of the same phrase).
140
See Clarke v. Boysen, 285 F. 122, 126 (8th Cir. 1922) (considering Equity Rule 48 for the
purposes of ensuring multiparty litigants are treated fairly).
141
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., L.L.C., 760 F.3d at 407 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding).
136
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confusion and inconsistent rulings. 142 In adjudicating the issue of removal
jurisdiction for mass actions under the CAFA, the Third, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits attempted to balance the CAFA’s legislative intent and tort public
policy.143 However, these circuits failed to agree on one approach that
embodied those two concepts, thereby creating a confusing interpretation
of the CAFA and inconsistent results.144 Therefore, a well-defined
standard used to evaluate removal jurisdiction of mass actions is needed
to eliminate confusion and balance the legislative intent of the CAFA
against tort public policy.145 First, Part III.B.1 considers circuit splits
generally and how they impact tort public policy. 146 Second, Part III.B.2
critiques the “Goldilocks Standard” of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits.147
1.

Circuit Splits Generally

In toxic tort litigation, circuit splits create confusion among
individuals seeking to bring a claim, which results in a myriad of other
potential problems.148 Specifically, circuit splits fail to provide a consistent
standard for judges to utilize, and the splits do not promote tort public
policy.149 Tort principles must provide tortfeasors with a clear, consistent,
and established standard as to when the defendant’s conduct arises from
the same event or occurrence.150 Circuit splits challenge and complicate
142
See supra Part III.A (evaluating the characteristics of circuit splits and analyzing the
impact circuit splits have on environmental torts).
143
See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 2013)
(reasoning that the phrase same event or occurrence is ambiguous; therefore, the court is able
to look at the legislative history of the CAFA or other external material); see also Allen v.
Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring to the Senate report on the CAFA and
interpreting the report to support the idea that the legislative history of the CAFA supports
an interpretation of the single local event exception applying to only truly local events);
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 410 (suggesting that the legislative history of the CAFA
supports the ordinary meaning of the phrase same event or occurrence).
144
See Complex Litigation Resource Guide, supra note 40 (stating the problems of confusion
and extortion with circuit splits and forum shopping).
145
See id. (explaining the problems common with circuit splits, such as confusion,
extortion, and forum shopping).
146
See infra Part III.B.1 (considering circuit splits and their detrimental impact generally).
147
See infra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the specific circuit split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits).
148
See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining how forum shopping violates the legislative intent of
the CAFA); see also Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–57 (exploring the concept of forum
shopping).
149
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (listing the different tort public policies that are
applicable to general torts and evaluating how those general policies are applicable to
environmental law).
150
See id. at 8–9 (providing that tort public policy should foster predictability in human
affairs). Along these lines, tort public policy suggests that parties should be made aware of
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this notion.151 The Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits each tried to resolve
the problem when each circuit created its own test; however, their
individual rulings contributed to the confusion by providing different
interpretations of what constitutes the same event or occurrence for the
purposes of removal.152
A clear, established standard for judges to evaluate when considering
the same event or occurrence under the CAFA would benefit the courts of
different jurisdictions by providing one coherent standard to apply when
adjudicating issues involving removal jurisdiction for mass
environmental torts.153 Adopting a test to determine same event or
occurrence would diminish the inconsistency across the Circuits, which
would promote the interest in balancing the judicial and legislative
branch.154 A clear standard would also help reduce the amount of time
courts currently spend trying to evaluate the vague application provided
by the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits. 155
When courts reach a decision in a timely fashion, plaintiffs are able to
get compensation quicker.156 A unified standard dealing with the issue of
removal jurisdiction for mass torts under the CAFA will allow full and
their dangerous actions and how those actions impact their surroundings. Id. Therefore, to
account for this, any laws made to restrict the behavior of an individual for the purposes of
public safety and public good should be clarified so the defendant can adapt his or her
conduct accordingly. Id.
151
See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2013)
(recommending a broader interpretation of the single local event exception under the
CAFA); see also Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (giving a more narrow
interpretation of the same event or occurrence under the CAFA); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v.
Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (exploring a more defined
interpretation of the holding in Abraham); see infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the three-way circuit
split of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuit, considering the impact that circuit split has on
tort public policy, and advocating for a unified standard to promote good tort public policy).
152
See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3 (exploring how to litigate class actions and
explaining that because class actions are a form of complex litigation, many problems may
arise, such as inconsistent outcomes that can cause confusion amongst the litigants).
153
See Latham et al., supra note 48, at 740–45 (discussing the gap between the regulations
used to handle environmental claims and the theories of common tort law). The gap between
different laws and regulations, as it relates to environmental claims, is a main cause of the
circuit split because judges look at similar facts under different lenses of interpretation. Id.
154
See Newman, supra note 48, at 512–13 (considering that courts have battled ambiguous
language in legislation, which raised new legal issues to be resolved, requiring judges to
balance both public policy and the different branches of government).
155
See Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (viewing
removal jurisdiction under the CAFA); see also supra Part II.C (exemplifying situations where
the federal courts have to evaluate the issue of the “same event or occurrence” exception to
removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts under the CAFA).
156
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (providing the tort public policy that aligns with the
view to fully compensate accident victims and advocating for a remedy to the circuit split so
that accident victims may receive their compensation more quickly).
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adequate compensation for accident victims by enabling a court to arrive
at a decision swiftly, thereby compensating the accident victim(s) faster.157
A balanced factor test would ensure that the defendant is liable for the
environmental catastrophe he or she caused.158
In addition, the confusion regarding the circuit split does not promote
economic growth.159 The complex nature of environmental torts creates
confusion for the parties involved when trying to determine if, when, and
how to litigate the action because the parties and attorneys cannot
adequately infer how a judge may rule on the case.160 Without a standard
to aid a judge in determining when to remand a case from federal court to
state court under the single local event exception, parties to a lawsuit do
not have the opportunity to weigh the risks and benefits of bringing a
lawsuit, as well as the potential cost of litigation.161 Circuit splits result in
unpredictable outcomes, so the parties tend to be less likely to settle and
will be more willing to embrace the financial burdens of a lengthy
lawsuit.162 By adopting a unified standard, the parties can weigh the
potential outcome of whether their cause has the grounds to be heard in
federal court or if it will be remanded back to the state court. 163 A unified
standard not only diminishes the costs of litigating this specific issue, but
157
See Clarke, supra note 59 (providing the theories of tort liability, such as joint liability,
vicarious liability, and contributory negligence, with each determining how a tortfeasor
divides the amount of money owed to the plaintiff for the injuries incurred as a result of his
or her negligence); see also supra Part II.A.2 (explaining one of the basic tort policies that
accident victims should be fully compensated); compare supra Part III.B.2 (stating the holdings
of the three-way circuit split), with infra Part IV.A (providing the four-factor contribution to
help facilitate the adjudication of the removal issue).
158
See infra Part IV (outlining the four-factor test that allows judges to apply a unified
standard while still being allowed to exercise their discretion with the complex nature of
class actions and urging courts to adopt the test to promote good tort public policy).
159
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing the two views of tort public policy favors
economic growth and that tort public policy promotes due deference and discussing why
economic growth is a tort public policy that courts seek to promote).
160
See Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 17, 18–19, 21–23 (2009) (examining solutions to resolve circuit splits at the federal
court of appeals level).
161
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 9 (articulating the tort public policies that surround the
costs of litigation); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (discussing how actions before the court that
involve a common question of law or fact may be joined to avoid any unnecessary costs or
delays). F.R.C.P. 23 is based on the desire to reduce costs of the parties seeking to bring a
claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). When mass actions have a common question of law or fact, they
too can be consolidated. Id. From this general rule, there is an inference that courts do not
favor costly litigation. Id. The vague standard of the CAFA requires that the parties spend
more money because of litigation, which goes against the purpose of the courts. Id.
162
See id. (suggesting how courts prefer to save on litigation costs).
163
See infra Part IV (providing a four-factor test that should be implemented by the federal
courts as a unified standard to resolve the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass actions
under the CAFA).
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it promotes settlements because one party may seek to settle the matter
outside of court if their claim cannot be heard in the court that is more
favorable to them.164
Defendants should be liable in a situation where the harm could have
been prevented.165 When adjudicating claims based upon a negligence
standard, courts have always considered the defendant’s intent and
care.166 Negligence is usually the cornerstone of most toxic tort lawsuits;
however, there are many interrelated negligence theories that also arise in
toxic torts.167 Adopting a clearer standard of the same event or occurrence
will ensure that federal courts will hear the issues of intent and care that
they are supposed to without encroaching on the state’s rights. 168 Thus,
to alleviate the confusion among parties and the judicial system, and for
the benefit of tort public policy, an all-inclusive standard for removal
jurisdiction needs to be adopted by the federal courts. 169
A distinct application of the same event or occurrence will help
facilitate growth and progress because judges will be able to give stricter

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (suggesting that claims that have similar contexts may be joined
to avoid unnecessary costs or delays); see also Bernstein, supra note 58, at 349–52 (arguing
how class actions impact the judicial system economically).
165
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 8 (stating that one of the general tort public policies that
should be promoted is the idea that those who bear the risk should also bear the burden of
the resulting harm that occurs because of the risk that was taken).
166
See id. at 7 (requiring that a defendant be held liable for the resulting harm if the
defendant is at fault).
167
See Peter K. Wahl & Rita A. Sheffey, Theories of Liability and Damages in Toxic Tort Cases,
in TOXIC TORT LITIGATION 17–18 (D. Alan Rudlin ed., 2007) (looking at the theories of
negligence found in toxic torts). There are many theories of negligence that arise in toxic
torts. Id. To have a successful negligence lawsuit, the plaintiff must show: (1) a duty or
obligation of the defendant required by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection
between the breach of the duty and the resulting harm; and (4) the resulting harm, also
known as damages. Id. at 18. The causal connection element, considering both actual and
proximate cause, is the most challenging element for toxic tort litigants to prove. Supra Part
III.A. However, there are other types of negligence actions such as negligence per se, gross
negligence, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Wahl & Sheffey, supra note 167, at 18. In
toxic tort cases, there are five specific types of negligence actions that directly correlate to
toxic torts: negligent failure to warn, negligent failure to investigate, negligent design,
breach of statutory and/or regulatory duties, and breach of self-imposed duties. Id. at 19–
23.
168
See 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012) (providing the purpose of the CAFA); see also infra Part III.B
(considering the history and language of the CAFA and looking at why it was enacted,
concluding that the framers of the CAFA had the desire to balance the interest of both the
state and federal courts and not give one court too much power over the other when
litigating mass actions).
169
See supra Part III.A (discussing generally how the three-way circuit split of the Third,
Ninth, and Fifth Circuit does not benefit tort public policy because characteristically, circuit
splits do not promote public policy and advocating for the adoption of a unified standard to
help promote sound tort public policy).
164
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rulings based on those standards, which will help advance the hazardous
materials industry to find better and more secure ways to prevent spills. 170
Environmental catastrophes cost large sums of money to clean and repair
the damage.171 Individuals who have a high risk for liability should use
the resources around them to help protect their interests and prevent the
potential harm, instead of waiting for the harm to occur and relying on the
judicial system to provide a remedy.172 The courts should adopt a
standard for the purpose of eliminating confusion and promoting
economic growth.173 The problem with circuit splits is exacerbated, as
exemplified by the circuit split between the Third, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits.174
2.

The “Goldilocks Standard” of the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits

In general, the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits’ application of the same
event or occurrence exception are either too broad or too narrow. 175 In
addition to being inconsistent, the interpretations fail to provide courts
with accurate guidelines to balance their authority to exercise discretion
with the defendant’s due process rights of removal.176 When the Third,
Ninth, and Fifth Circuits individually determined what is considered the
same event or occurrence in a mass environmental tort for removal to
170
See supra Part III (evaluating how circuit splits in general do not promote sound tort
public policy and a unified standard should be enacted to promote tort public policy, how
the intent of the CAFA is not being promoted through the circuit split, and how the phrase
same event or occurrence should not be based on a view that is too broad or too narrow, but
one that generally aligns with the Fifth Circuit).
171
See Gilbert & Kent, supra note 4 (exemplifying the costs associated with environmental
catastrophes such as oil spills); see also Neuhauser, supra note 1 (using the oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico to exemplify how it is possible the funds will not adequately compensate the
victims, such as private business owners, of the oil spill).
172
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 6–9 (providing the nine tort public policies applicable to
mass actions and environmental torts, and separating them into three general purposes that
courts seek to promote when adjudicating cases).
173
See infra Part IV (suggesting four factors that courts should adopt to determine the issue
of whether a mass action is a class action under the same event or occurrence exception for
the purposes of removal jurisdiction of mass actions under the CAFA).
174
See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating that the St. Croix Renaissance Group owned an aluminum refinery that released red
mud into the air for a period of thirty years); see also Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 627,
630, 632 (9th Cir. 2015) (asserting that the defendant was negligent by failing to warn the
plaintiffs of the potential groundwater contamination); Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury
Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2014) (alleging that the defendant, Denbury,
negligently operated a drilling pipe and well).
175
See infra Part III.B.2 (critiquing the three-way circuit split of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits).
176
See Tarlock, supra note 27, at 222 (considering how courts interpret environmental
legislation and the challenges they have with evaluating and applying the legal standards).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6

Myers: Removing the Mass Misperception: A Consideration of Mass Environm

2016]

Mass Misperception

195

federal court, they returned three different holdings. 177 Each holding has
successful merits in defining the same event or occurrence; however, the
holdings do not coordinate to create one concise, cohesive rule that federal
courts may apply.178 While judges must consider the legislative intent of
the CAFA when applying the statute, the courts have difficulty
When
consistently determining what the legislative intent is. 179
examining the legislative intent of the CAFA, the drafters did not want an
approach for removal jurisdiction of mass actions to be too broad or too
narrow.180 The “Goldilocks Standard” of the same event or occurrence
exception harmonizes one single event, which is too narrow, a continuing
set of circumstances, which is too broad, and a continuing set of
circumstances that are contextually connected, which is just right. 181 First,
Part III.B.2.a critiques the Third Circuit’s broad holding in Abraham.182
Second, Part III.B.2.b analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of
the phrase same event or occurrence as not being successful in the context
of mass environmental torts in Allen.183 Finally, Part III.B.2.c evaluates the

177
See Allen, 784 F.3d at 631 (limiting the single event exception to one single happening
or one single event); Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (arguing “[t]he word event . . . is not always
confined to a discrete happening that occurs over a short time span such as a fire, explosion,
hurricane[,] or chemical spill” and ultimately concluding that an environmental hazard that
has a continuing nature, may fit the “event” element of the local single event exception of
the CAFA) (emphasis in original); see also Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (holding
that because Denbury’s acts were ongoing patterns of conduct that were contextually
connected, the continuous harm that the plaintiffs suffered all occurred in one event).
178
See infra Part III.A (describing the critiques of the circuit splits).
179
See United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that when looking
to determine the scope of a statute, one must look to the ordinary meaning in the language
of the statute); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judicial
department has a duty and the authority to determine what the law is).
180
See supra Part II.B (analyzing the CAFA by looking at the English Courts of Equity’s
previous attempts at combating corruption in environmental torts through regulations, and
ultimately discussing how the CAFA was ratified in 2005).
181
See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (broadening the language of the CAFA single local event
exception to encompass a continuing set of circumstances); see also Allen, 784 F.3d at 631
(narrowing the single event or occurrence language to only one single happening); Rainbow
Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (providing the most acceptable interpretation of the CAFA by
holding that the same event or occurrence may be a continuing set of circumstances so long
as they are contextually connected).
182
See infra Part III.B.2.a (exploring the problem of a broad interpretation stating that it
further allows for corruption and does not provide a valid solution to the circuit split).
183
See infra Part III.B.2.b (reasoning that a narrow view of the single local event exception
does not allow for the consideration of the unique characteristics of mass environmental
torts).
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Fifth Circuit’s holding in Denbury as the most successful interpretation of
the single local event exception.184
a.

Too Hot: The Broad Holding of the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit, while making valid claims, provides an approach
that is too broad of a spectrum for the federal courts to apply.185 Under
the Third Circuit’s holding, the same event or occurrence can be multiple
events.186 The overly expansive view of the Third Circuit allows courts to
exercise their discretion, but fails to provide guidelines or limits that allow
courts to properly exercise that discretion.187 The proponents of the Third
Circuit’s ruling argue that this Circuit is the most accurate in applying the
same event or occurrence definition because the Court was merely
interpreting the words as the law allows them, but flounders in the
accurate interpretation of the phrase by providing a view that is too broad
to adequately litigate the issue.188
In spite of the fact that a single tort is not always limited to one single
event and may in fact be multiple happenings, the Court in United States
v. Diallo held that when there is no statutory definition for the courts to
interpret, judges are confined to apply the ordinary meaning of the
word.189 As such, a broad approach goes directly against the legislative
intent of the CAFA because the CAFA sets out multiple exceptions and a
broad interpretation of the same event or occurrence diminishes the value
of those exceptions.190 When a broad definition is applied, courts construe
cases and facts that may not fit within the exception, yet apply them as if
they do.191
Furthermore, a definition of same event or occurrence that is too
broad may result in joining defendants that may not have actually caused

184
See infra Part III.B.2.c (stating the reasons why the Fifth Circuit has the best
interpretation of the phrase same event or occurrence under the CAFA and explaining how
it will be used for the contribution).
185
See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (concluding that an event may be continuing in nature).
186
See id. (providing the holding of the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the single local
event exception).
187
See Latham et al., supra note 48, at 740–45 (considering how judges evaluate tort
common law and the legislative developments to more adequately compensate
environmental tort victims).
188
See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (noting one of the cases involved in the three-way circuit
split).
189
See United States v. Diallo, 575 F.3d 252, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (exemplifying the duty of
the courts to interpret legislation).
190
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(11)(B)(ii) (2012) (providing the multiple exceptions that are
found within the CAFA).
191
See id. (discussing the exceptions that are found within the CAFA).
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the harm.192 The purpose of bringing an action against numerous
defendants is to ensure that the defendants to a mass lawsuit are not taken
advantage of and to guarantee that all of the plaintiffs are equally
compensated.193 Thus, their claims and relief sought must all be similar. 194
The proposed standard seeks to ensure that the defendants of mass
lawsuits are not taken advantage of, while guaranteeing that the plaintiffs
are equally compensated by requiring all of the claims and relief sought
to be similar—particularly, having the sameness in all essential details of
a claim.195 This aspect of the test allows for the promotion of economic
growth by ensuring that the parties are adequately compensated, are
aware of how their claim may fare under the judge’s ruling, and are all
interested parties in the lawsuit.196
b.

Too Cold: The Restrictive View of the Ninth Circuit

The view of the Ninth Circuit succeeds at ensuring that the claims of
the mass action that arise out of the same event or occurrence are
remanded down to the state courts; however, the view is too narrow to
limit the standard to only one distinct act. 197 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit held that these views relate to the legislative intent of the drafters
of the CAFA, arguing that the application of the ordinary meaning was
intended when interpreting a definition. 198
The Ninth Circuit further argued that the legislative intent of the
single local event exception is a narrowly construed standard because
states have an interest in adjudicating issues where the source and harm
arise in the same place.199 However, a narrow view also undermines the
legislative intent because it weakens the extent of Congress to allow state
192
See Complex Litigation Resource Guide, supra note 40 (examining the problems associated
with parties involved in multiparty claims).
193
See Rice, supra note 38, at 885, 887–89 (addressing the problems associated with the
fictitious defendant).
194
See Ellis, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining how mass environmental torts involve large
numbers of plaintiffs or defendants).
195
See Similar, LAW DICTIONARY (2015), http://thelawdictionary.org/similar/
[https://perma.cc/G3BW-M73E] (defining “similar” as a “word [that] is often used to
de[n]ote a partial resemblance only; but it is also often used to denote sameness in all
essential particulars. Thus, a statutory provision in relation to ‘previous conviction of a
similar offense’ may mean conviction of an offense identical in kind”).
196
See infra Part IV (considering the SORT Test to resolve some of the problems with the
circuit splits).
197
See Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that actions are
considered the same event if it is a single happening).
198
See Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Grp., L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2013)
(reiterating the legislative intent of the CAFA).
199
See id. at 274 (showing that the purpose is to ensure state courts hear claims with only
truly localized issues).
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courts to adjudicate truly localized claims with truly localized harms. 200
Furthermore, toxic torts consider how certain strains of chemicals and
substances impact the human body and the plaintiff must also prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s
harm.201 Thus, a narrow view, such as the one the Ninth Circuit applied,
does not provide an equitable or fair consideration to the rules because it
does not take into consideration the nature of the environmental tort. 202
c.

Just Right: The Reasonable Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Denbury provided the most acceptable
explanation of what defines a single event or occurrence.203 The Fifth
Circuit held that because the environmental hazard was an ongoing
pattern and each instance of that pattern was contextually connected, the
events were all interconnected and could be viewed as one single event.204
Unlike the Third and Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit provided an
interpretation of same event or occurrence language that is not too broad,
nor too narrow.205 Starting with the same preliminary interpretation like
the Third Circuit in Abraham, the Fifth Circuit further reasoned that an
event can in fact be a continuing condition and is not limited to a single
moment in time.206 Stopping with that interpretation would have created
the same problem as the Third Circuit with an approach that was too
broad; however, to eliminate the broad language in the CAFA, the Fifth
Circuit also reasoned that because the events were contextually connected
and when completed, created a related event, they could fall under the
same event or occurrence.207
200
See Allen, 784 F.3d at 627, 630, 632 (examining the abuse that occurs with class actions);
see also Abraham, 719 F.3d at 274 (articulating why the Third Circuit affirmed the holding of
the District Court).
201
See Note, supra note 32, at 2261 (explaining that specific causation requires a plaintiff to
prove the defendant caused the resulting harm).
202
See Veron, supra note 44, at 647–48 (exploring toxic torts and their impacts on the
litigation procedure due to their fact specific nature); see also Thompson, supra note 47, at
249–50 (evaluating the issue of causation and how it relates to mass environmental torts).
203
See infra Part IV.B (detailing the factors of the test proposed in Part IV.A).
204
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405, 409–11 (5th Cir.
2014) (stating that ongoing patterns of conduct that are contextually connected are the same
event or occurrence).
205
See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277 (holding that a continued release of a hazardous material
is a single event, but providing no restraints on the rule); see also Allen, 784 F.3d at 629
(limiting the phrase “same event or occurrence” to one single event, providing an approach
that is too narrow).
206
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 412 (agreeing partially with the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of the phrase “same event or occurrence”).
207
See id. (believing that as long as the continuous events are contextually connected, the
events arise out of the same event or occurrence).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/6

Myers: Removing the Mass Misperception: A Consideration of Mass Environm

2016]

Mass Misperception

199

By narrowing the approach of the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
eliminates the problem that defendants, who may not have any
connection to the harm, are required to respond to the complaint and
spend large sums of money to defend against claims that should have
never been filed against them in the first place.208 In environmental toxic
torts, courts face the problem of consolidating and aggregating individual
litigants who may not have suffered the same harm as the rest of the
class.209 This expedites potential exploitation of the judicial system and
allows a plaintiff to receive more compensation than he or she actually
deserves.210 Therefore, by further analyzing the problem to allow for
continuing events that are contextually connected, the Fifth Circuit takes
a broad interpretation and narrows it to the correct scheme without
narrowing the problem too much. 211
One unique characteristic of environmental torts that current
legislation does not acknowledge is a latency period. 212 The latency period
associated with toxic torts presents courts with a challenge in determining
when the resulting harm occurs and what the resulting harm was. 213 To
balance both a vague and a narrow definition, this Note proposes a time
frame of thirty years to bring a claim for an environmental harm. 214 The
defendant in the Denbury case properly asserted “[f]or the exception of the
statute to have any real meaning, there must be a limit.” 215 Thus, a
208
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collision, 80
COR. L. REV. 851, 853 (taking the position that mass tort litigation is shifting from being
favorable to plaintiffs to acting as a shield for defendants).
209
See Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978) (defining a consolidated claim);
see also Eric Posner & Ariel Porat, Aggregation and Law, 7–22 (Jan. 2011),
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=law_an
d_economics [https://perma.cc/6Q35-PCX7] (exploring the concept of aggregation in tort
law). Factual aggregation occurs when the issue is focused on whether the defendant
committed a specific wrong at a certain time and place. Posner & Porat, supra note 209, at 7.
210
See Lahav, supra note 78, at 65–66 n.3 (analyzing small claims class actions, the issues
surrounding the settlement phase of class actions, and recognizing class actions do not fit
nicely within one narrow viewpoint).
211
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 413 (providing the holding of the Fifth Circuit by
allowing events that are contextually connected to be deemed the same event or occurrence).
212
See Lin, supra note 34, at 1441–42, 1445–46 (asserting that a latency period is common in
toxic torts, and defining the latency period as a period of time between when the harm was
suffered and when the results of that harm actually became apparent).
213
See Wells, supra note 35, 288–90 nn.17, 22, 294 n.59 (evaluating the latency period of toxic
torts).
214
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 409 (agreeing in part with the Third Circuit, but
further interpreting the single local event exception as allowing continuing events that are
contextually connected to be continuing events for the purpose of removal jurisdiction under
the CAFA); see also Note, supra note 32, at 2261 (discussing the latency period of
environmental torts).
215
Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 407.
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definition of the same event or occurrence involving toxic torts needs to
consider that the resulting harm may take years to appear, but an
indefinite standard will not be beneficial, nor fair under tort public
policy.216 The thirty-year period takes into consideration the latency
period for the resulting harm in environmental torts and balances the
interests of all the parties involved. 217 As such, the standard proposed in
this Note aims to further define and exemplify what is considered a
contextually connected event, which enables a court to ensure that it is
hearing the claims it has the authority to review.218 The proposed
standard balances the Fifth Circuit’s holding with the unique
characteristics of mass environmental torts to adopt a standard that is
easily applicable by the federal courts.219
Although the Third, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits and the drafters of the
CAFA took a step in the right direction by trying to prevent the corruption
that is characteristically present in mass actions, a clear standard must be
created for the single local event exception and the same event or
occurrence requirement.220 Therefore, a standard must be applied that
will allow for a fair and equitable relief for the plaintiffs while taking into
account the unique and specific nature of environmental torts. 221 The
SORT Test is offered as an aid to prevent any potential for corruption.222
Environmental cases require a strong factual support for a finding of
liability.223 Due to the specific nature of these claims, it is more
challenging for the court to apply a rule that is too narrow or too broad,
such as the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and the Third Circuit’s ruling. 224 A
factor test is the most appropriate because it gives the courts the discretion

See infra Part IV (stating a unified standard for the same event or occurrence).
See infra Part IV (providing the third factor within the SORT Test, which discusses a
thirty-year-time period for multiple events to be the same event or occurrence); see also Wells,
supra note 35, at 288–90 nn.17–22 (examining the time frame for the latency period).
218
See Rainbow Gun Club, Inc., 760 F.3d at 409–11 (redefining the Third Circuit’s holding
and requiring there be contextually connected events to be considered the same event, not
just a continuing set of circumstances).
219
See infra Part IV (proposing the unified standard for courts to adopt).
220
See supra Part II.B (discussing the CAFA); see also supra Part II.C (analyzing the circuit
split); infra Part IV (providing the four-factor-balancing test).
221
See Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (stating the problems of causation and the plaintiff’s
duty to allege the resulting harm); see also supra Part II.A (exemplifying the characteristics of
the environmental torts).
222
See infra Part IV (contributing a four-factor-balancing test for courts to apply when
considering mass torts and the requirements of “same event or occurrence”).
223
See Note, supra note 32, at 2269 (explaining the issue of causation and importance of
causation as an element in proving liability for environmental torts).
224
See supra Part III.A (considering the problem with the circuit splits and addressing the
challenges and how to combat them).
216
217
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to hear these cases while being considerate of the fact specific nature of
each claim.225
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Current legislation considering and regulating mass actions fails to
consistently apply these overly vague discretionary standards to mass
environmental torts. As such, a consistent, clear standard for what the
same event or occurrence constitutes must be provided to gives courts the
appropriate amount of discretion, while providing clear guidelines that
are understandable to all the parties involved.226 The current circuit split
exists because there is no clear standard for courts to abide by when
determining removal jurisdiction of mass environmental torts. 227
Therefore, courts need one succinct test to determine when a mass action
arises out of the same event or occurrence and thus, is not removable to
federal court.228 To begin, Part IV.A proposes the language and factor test
that courts should utilize when evaluating the issue of removal
jurisdiction for mass environmental torts. 229 Then, Part IV.B explains each
of the proposed factors and addresses any potential counterarguments
that may arise when addressing these factors. 230
A. Proposed Factor Test
To remove the mass confusion from removal jurisdiction of mass
environmental torts, under the CAFA, the following four factors should
be used by federal judges to determine when a mass environmental tort
arises out of the same event or occurrence:
The SORT Test
Upon removal to federal court, a mass environmental
claim may be remanded back to the state court, under the
CAFA, if the claim falls under the single local event
exception. The single local event exception is met when
the resulting harm from the environmental spill or
See id. (addressing the problems with circuit splits).
See supra Part III (advocating for the application of one cohesive and concise standard
to the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts).
227
See Juenger, supra note 40, at 553–57 (identifying problems associated with circuit splits,
such as inconsistent results and forum shopping).
228
See infra Part IV.A (contributing a four-factor-balancing test for courts to evaluate when
determining the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts).
229
See infra Part IV.A (proposing the SORT factor test).
230
See infra Part IV.B (evaluating and discussing the factor test).
225
226
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contamination arises under the same event or occurrence.
When evaluating what is considered the same event or
occurrence the court should balance the following four
factors:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Whether the resulting harm incurred by the plaintiffs
originated from the same source;
Whether the defendant had notice that the resulting
harm could have occurred or was occurring;
Whether each of the individual plaintiffs suffered
similar resulting harms and are seeking similar relief;
and
Whether the period for the environmental
catastrophe extended beyond thirty years.231

B. Commentary
Federal courts have failed to adequately resolve the discrepancy of the
phrase “same event or occurrence” under the CAFA, which causes both
economic strife among the parties and confusion within the court
system.232 The inconsistent rulings do not provide a succinct holding
applicable to future cases.233 As such, the current standard for same event
231
The SORT Test is the contribution of the author. The SORT Test gets its name from the
four factors above: same source, occurrence of the hazard, resulting harms, and time frame
of thirty years. See supra Part IV.A (proposing the four-factor-balancing test). The first factor
eliminates the problem of complex litigation involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants by
ensuring that the defendants in the lawsuit actually caused the harm to the plaintiff. See
supra Part II.A.1 (considering that one characteristic of environmental torts is a complex
litigation procedure that tends to involve multiple plaintiffs and defendants, that raises
issues of causation, and questions whether the defendant actually caused all of the individual
plaintiffs’ harms).
The second factor ensures that the plaintiffs are not being
overcompensated or undercompensated for the harm that results, allowing for the public
policy that tort victims should be fully compensated while balancing theories of equity. See
supra Part II.A.1 (providing a medical hypothetical in a footnote to model the concept that
the resulting harm in one patient may not result in an identical harm of another patient). The
language of the third factor relies on the strict liability standard of toxic torts and ensures
that defendants who could have prevented the injuries are responsible for the resulting
harm. See supra Part II.A.2 (evaluating the public policies of torts and applying them to toxic
torts). The final factor takes into account the specific nature of the environmental toxic torts
and considers the possibility that the harm suffered by the plaintiff may appear as much as
thirty years later. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the latency period surrounding
environmental torts); see also Wells, supra note 35, at 288–90 nn.17, 22 (exploring the concept
of the latency period).
232
See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3 (providing examples of the potential
problems that may arise as a result of circuit splits).
233
See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, at 241–43 (stating a problem in the judicial system
is that judges do not rule consistently).
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or occurrence under the CAFA fails to provide clear removal guidelines
for defendants.234 Thus, courts should adopt the four-factor SORT Test for
determining when an event falls under the same event or occurrence
exception, requiring the mass action to remain in state courts rather than
federal courts.235 If adopted by the federal courts, the proposed factor test
will resolve the circuit split, eliminate the confusion surrounding removal
jurisdiction of mass torts, and remedy the vague language of the CAFA.236
Using the proposed factor test, courts still have discretion, but are limited
to the context and fact specific nature of the claims. 237 By adopting the
proposed test, federal judges will be able to adequately determine
whether a claim is truly localized, eliminating the corruption associated
with the removal of mass actions.238
Nevertheless, critics may argue the legislature should apply and
define this standard within the CAFA itself.239 However, this test strictly
is limited to the unique nature of mass environmental torts. 240 The CAFA
is designed to discuss class actions and mass actions generally. 241 This test
is applicable for the purposes of mass environmental torts, which tend to
be more narrowly viewed.242 Because mass environmental torts are very
fact specific, the judges are in the best position to execute the proposed

234
See supra Part III (exploring the problems with the current language of the single local
event exception of the CAFA).
235
See supra Part IV (suggesting the language for the SORT test).
236
See supra Part IV.A (examining the SORT Test and providing the legal framework for
its basis).
237
See supra Part II.A (discussing only environmental toxic torts for the purpose of this
Note).
238
See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3, 5 (analyzing how confusion can lead to
corruption when litigating mass actions).
239
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2012) (stating that the federal court has the discretion to
choose not to exercise jurisdiction over a mass action when more than one-third, but fewer
than two-thirds, of the foreign state citizens and the primary defendants are also citizens of
the forum state); see also § 1332(d)(4)(B) (requiring courts to decline jurisdiction if two-thirds
or more of the class members and the primary defendants are citizens of the forum state);
§ 1332(d)(4)(A) (stating that courts need to decline jurisdiction over a mass action when the
principal injuries occurred in the forum state or where no similar class action involving any
of the same defendants was filed during the three-year period before the filing of the
complaint at issue).
240
See Blomquist, supra note 47, at 25 (defining toxic torts and discussing their place in the
judicial system).
241
See § 1332(d) (addressing how class actions will be litigated and what constitutes a class
action).
242
See Lin, supra note 34, at 1445 (articulating how environmental torts tend to be more
fact-specific, and thus, tend to have more narrow approaches to their interpretation of the
resulting harm).
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standard.243 Therefore, this standard is better implemented by the federal
courts, rather than amending the enacted legislation.244
Critics of this test may also argue that this test provides standards that
are just as vague and confusing as the ones the courts previously
provided.245 The purpose of this test is to provide unified factors for a
judge to consider when presented with the issue of removing a mass
environmental tort action to federal court.246 The test seeks to provide a
balance between limiting the court’s authority to hear a claim and the fact
specific nature of the claim.247 Thus, courts can use this standard as a
stepping stone and look to other court cases to determine how best to
apply the standard and use their discretion in the claim.248
Furthermore, the proposed approach may allow parties seeking to
bring a removal action to assist with the interpretation of the standard. 249
It is likely that from these standards, the parties themselves will be able to
determine whether their claim is removable to federal court. 250 There is
no guarantee that adopting this test will deter frivolous lawsuits
completely, but it may eliminate some of the unnecessary lawsuits by
providing the parties with notice regarding how the court will interpret
the defendant’s conduct for the purposes of the single local event
exception of the CAFA.251

243
See supra Part IV.A (giving the standard federal courts should adopt to resolve the
vague language in the CAFA).
244
See supra Part IV (arguing for the adoption of the SORT test by the courts).
245
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972) (mitigating water pollution on a national
scale); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990) (suggesting a way to prevent oil spills); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(b), (c) (1963) (controlling air pollutants on a national scale);
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969) (promoting a safe and clean
environment).
246
See supra Part IV (providing the standard for courts to adopt).
247
See Newman, supra note 48, at 512–13 (arguing for the need to balance legislative intent
and respect the different branches of government).
248
See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (stating
that there is no antiremoval presumption for a removal action of the CAFA); see also Benko
v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing the plaintiffs to
remove the case to federal court); Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 882 (9th
Cir. 2013) (discussing the diversity of citizenship requirement under the CAFA); Coleman v.
Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding the case back to state
court since the requirements of the CAFA were not met).
249
See Newman, supra note 48, at 513 (raising the issues of circuit splits and stating how
judges’ opinions are highly regarded, and thus, circuit splits should be resolved for that
purpose).
250
See id. (discussing when a party is able to weigh the risks and benefits of litigating a
claim).
251
See supra Part III.A (arguing how the current circuit split does not create one cohesive
standard).
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While critics may also argue that this factor test appears to disfavor
defendants and big corporations, such as BP, this test does not prohibit
claims to be heard in federal court.252 The purpose and goal of the SORT
Test is to ensure that removal issues for mass environmental torts are
interpreted on the same level, which is beneficial for both parties.253
Furthermore, the SORT Test is necessary, whether or not it tends to favor
one party over another, because these types of environmental cases tend
to impact more than just one individual, but also surrounding
communities.254 Resolving this issue for the purposes of public policy has
a greater interest than providing one party a forum it finds more
favorable.255 Finally, if applying this test creates a result that is
unfavorable, the parties still have the option of settlement, which is
encouraged by the courts.256
Finally, critics may also argue the factors are too similar to F.R.C.P. 23,
which was not successful in regulating class actions originally, resulting
in the ratification of the CAFA.257 While the factors found in F.R.C.P. 23
appear on its face to be similar to the SORT Test, contextually they are
very different.258 F.R.C.P. 23 only applies to class actions. 259 This Note
considers the characteristics of mass actions, which is a type of class action,
and these factors are focused solely on the claims of mass actions.260 More
specifically, these factors seek to resolve a problem with mass actions in
environmental law.261 F.R.C.P. 23, like the CAFA, only looks at class

252
See supra Part IV.A (providing the SORT Test and explaining how the four factors are
to be used when evaluating the issue of removal jurisdiction for mass environmental torts).
253
See Beim & Rader, supra note 97, at 1 (indicating some of the problems associated with
circuit splits); see also ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 73, at 3, 5 (stating the issues that can
result due to circuit splits).
254
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993) (exemplifying a
situation where an environmental catastrophe had a detrimental impact on the surrounding
community).
255
See JOHNSON, supra note 50, at 7–9 (listing the twelve tort public policies applicable to
tort law); see supra Part II.A.2 (categorizing nine of the general tort public policies and
applying them to mass environmental torts).
256
See Greer & Peyronnin, supra note 86, 240–43 (discussing how it is currently more
challenging to manage proposed settlements in circuit splits and class actions).
257
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012) (evaluating the history of the CAFA taking into
consideration the F.R.C.P. regarding removal of class actions).
258
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (explaining class actions under the F.R.C.P.).
259
Compare § 1332(d)(11)(A) (defining a class action), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (providing
the guidelines that are required to have a class action under the F.R.C.P.); but see
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (explaining when a mass action is deemed a class action).
260
See supra Part II.B (explaining the difference between a class action and a mass action).
261
See supra Part II.A (focusing solely on environmental torts and toxic tort litigation).
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actions from a broad and general perspective.262 Therefore, the two tests,
while similar on their face, relate to two different types of actions. 263
V. CONCLUSION
This Note established the significant and dire need for a clear standard
for the single local event exception under the CAFA. The proposed test
will resolve the current confusion and discrepancies of what constitutes a
single event for the purposes of removal jurisdiction. Without a unified
standard for mass actions for federal courts to adopt, courts will spend
both time and money litigating issues that could have easily been
resolved. Thus, courts should adopt the proposed factor test to facilitate
the already hectic litigation process for both the plaintiff and the
defendant. The SORT test will promote tort public policy, diminish
corruption associated with complex litigation procedures, and allow for
the return of consistent judgments.
In the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, if each of the private beachfront
property owners were to bring a mass action claim against BP, under the
SORT test, they would be able to keep their claim in state court. BP would
not be able to prove through the SORT test that the harm these property
owners incurred arose out of different and separate events. Thus, their
claim would be one that arises out of the same event or occurrence under
the CAFA and would be able to be remanded back to state court under the
single local event exception. The SORT Test will help judges consistently
adjudicate claims similar to the ones brought against BP.
Kirsten Z. Myers

See § 1332(d)(1)(B) (discussing class action lawsuits and determining how mass actions
are applicable to class actions lawsuits).
263
See supra Part II.B (analyzing the CAFA and the F.R.C.P.).
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